Feminist Legal Writing

KATHRYN M. STANCIU*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.
ID.
IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................387
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVENTIONAL PERSUASIVE
LEGAL WRITING .................................................................................................389
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTILANGUAGE ....................................................... .399
FEMINIST LEGAL ANTILANGUAGE...................................................................... .402
A. Relexicalization ....................................................................................... .405
B. Negation: Irony, Paradox, Sarcasm, and Reclassification ...................... .408
C. Poetic Devices: Metaphor, Figures of Speech, and Rhythm .................... .416
D. Narrative Standpoint and Emotion .......................................................... .428
CONCLUSION ·····································································································.434

I. INTRODUCTION

Audre Larde once wrote that the "master's tools will never dismantle
the master's house." 1 In other words, there is only so much change that
those opposing the current social structures can achieve by working
within the rules and confines of those same social structures. This is
,. Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Susan L. DeJamatt, Anthony Niedwiecki, Melanie Jacobs, Jane
B. Baron, Laura Little, Ellie Margolis, and Mindy Friedman for their challenging and
thoughtful critiques of earlier drafts. Special thanks also go to Peter J. Isajiw for his
insights and his research and to Brandon Reish for his research and help with footnotes.
This Article was supported by grants from Temple University School of Law.
1. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in
THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 98, 99
(Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 2d ed. 1983).
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undoubtedly true. It presents a dilemma, however, for feminist legal
advocates, whether scholars or lawyers, whose primary tool for resisting
entrenched, sexist laws is writing-writing as and to lawyers, no less.
As sociolinguists have long pointed out, language is one of the "master's
tools"-language both reflects and consolidates existing social
structures, including inequitable relations and power differentials. 2
Legal language is no different-indeed, it is, in many ways, the
quintessential master's tool in that it is a language traditionally
accessible only to the wealthy and powerfui3 and notorious for its
conservatism and imperviousness to ideas that challenge its basic
•
4
assumptions.
Because feminist legal advocates must use legal writing to persuade
their audience and push for change in the law, they must confront the
dilemma of whether to follow legal writing conventions and risk altering
or losing their feminist message or whether to break from convention
and risk losing the legal audience. Feminist legal scholarship, in many
different ways, has made great progress in dealing with this dilemma.
The focus of this Article, however, is on several pieces of feminist legal
scholarship that have confronted the dilemma by pushing the bounds of
conventional legal language and legal writing. These pieces, by
breaking what have become some of the most central rules of
conventional legal advocacy, have created a legal writing genre that is
simultaneously subversive and persuasive.
To lay the groundwork for the exploration of feminist legal writing,
this Article first summarizes the traditions and conventions of persuasion
and persuasive writing-how they are characterized in law and how they
are taught in law school. It then summarizes a type of language in
linguistic theory called "antilanguage," which is language created by
groups in society that are outcasts or otherwise excluded from the
dominant social class to rebel against the dominant class. 5 Analyzing
several pieces of feminist legal scholarship that use unconventional
writing techniques, this Article identifies a type of feminist legal
antilanguage. This feminist legal antilanguage uses antilanguage
techniques to persuade and to convey the author's substantive (feminist)
message. This Article concludes that the writing of feminist legal
2. See ROGER FOWLER ET AL., LANGUAGE AND CONTROL 2, 190, 195 ( 1979).
3. It is a so-called "high language" or "language of power." Lucinda M. Finley,
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 888, 893 (1989); Kathryn M. Stanchi,
Resistance ls Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's
Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Stanchi,
Resistance].
4. Finley, supra note 3, at 890; see also Stanchi, Resistance, supra note 3, at 26-29.
5. M.A. K. Halliday, Antilanguages, 78 AM. AN!HROPOLOGIST 570,570 (1976).
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antilanguage calls out for careful study, not only because it is unconventional
and beautiful, but because its rhetorical power6 suggests that advocates
should consider and question the conventional wisdom that defines legal
writing, persuasion, and persuasive writing.

JI. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVENTIONAL PERSUASIVE
LEGAL WRITING

Most traditional legal scholarship-especially the legal scholarship
advocating change in the law-is a form of persuasive legal writing. It
sets forth a thesis or point of view and seeks to convince the reader using
forceful writing and reasoning. 7 To persuade, legal scholarship, like
bnef writing and other types of persuasive legal writing, must be
accessible to and attractive to its audience, which consists primarily of
lawyers. To do this, it must, by and large, operate within the rules for
persuasion prescribed by the community of legal discourse. Persuasive
writing in law also requires not only a high degree of conventionality,
but a delicate attention to the psychology and personality of the legal
audience. Persuasion requires that the writer connect with the reader on
a fundamental analytical, linguistic, and personal level. 8
As languages go, persuasive legal writing is highly constrained-it
6. The words "rhetoric" or "rhetorical" have many diverse meanings, some of
which are positive and some negative. Compare Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 522 (1999) (stating that rhetoric has developed negative
connotations) with Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A Realist
and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67
UMKC L. REV. 285, 293-94 (1998) (using rhetoric as a positive term). In this Article,
rhetoric is meant to be a positive term meaning persuasive, the essence of excellent
lawyering and advocacy. When modified by the word "classical," rhetoric means the
formal "art or the discipline that deals with the use of discourse ... to inform or persuade
or motivate an audience." EDWARD P. J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE
MODERN STUDENT 3 (3d ed. 1990).
7. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va.
L. Rev. 1545, 1571 (1990). Wetlaufer compares the rhetoric of legal scholarship to legal
advocacy and finds they are similar in their use of "deductive, syllogistic logic" to
"control [the] reader at every point and essentially to compel her assent." Id. at 1571.
See generally BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE
BRIEFING IN TRIAL AND APPELLA1E COURTS (1999) (setting forth a methodology for
drafting a persuasive legal brief); SIBVEN D. STARK, WRITING TO WIN xvi (1999)
(providing rules for more organized, persuasive legal writing).
8. See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 366 (1984-1985) (noting that "dialogue demands shared
experience"); Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 2458 (1989)
(stating that "persuasion starts by creating a relationship between oneself and others").
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has a somewhat rigid set of rules for discourse and argumentation that
the writer must use to reach the audience. 9 In persuasive legal writing,
there is some rhetoric that is acceptable, and some that is not; there are
some argument techniques that are proper, and some that must be
avoided. Most every lawyer knows the rules because mastery of these
rules, also called "thinking like a lawyer," is the primary goal of law
school training. Formalism is alive and well in both persuasive legal
writing and law school pedagogy.
The many constraints of persuasive legal writing are closely related to
the centrality of "audience" and "purpose" in legal writing. Because the
primary goal of persuasive legal writing is to persuade the audience, it is
essential that the writing be accessible to and convincing to the
audience. 10 Although the target audience for legal scholarship can vary
among judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, or all of the above, the
audience usually consists of lawyers-people with legal training. The
"rules" of legal rhetoric and writing taught in law school, rules adhered
to by the legal audience, are, to a large extent, what constrain persuasive
legal writing. The least risky strategy, the one most likely to persuade, is
the one that has the qualities favored by the legal audience-the one that
follows the rules. 11
The stylistic conventions of persuasive legal writing are driven by the
related notions of control and ease. First, the persuasive legal writer
strives to control the reader's journey through the document as much as

9. J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69
WASH. L. REV. 35, 51, 59-60 (1994) (noting that legal writing takes place in a discourse
that is complex and "highly conventionalized"); Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558 (stating
that a good lawyer's rhetoric of advocacy "operate[s] within a number of quite specific
rhetorical conventions").
10. HELENE S. SHAP0 ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 239 (3d ed.
1995); see also ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW
STUDENTS 66 (1995); MARGARET Z. JOHNS, PROFESSIONAL WRITING FOR LAWYERS 199
(1998); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 274 (3d ed.
1998); MARY BARNARD RAY & JILL J. RAMSAELD, LEGAL WRITING: GETTING IT RIGHT
AND GETTING IT WRITTEN 25-28 (2d ed. 1993); NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO,
JR., LEGAL WRITING AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 101 (3d ed. 1998).
11. Interestingly, the effectiveness and rigor of legal training hinders the use of
unconventional rhetoric and argumentation in persuasive legal writing. Lawyers are
trained to "think" a certain way, some of them become law professors and train others to
"think" that way in a circular, recursive process that keeps the law (and persuasive legal
writing and thinking) conventional and constrained. See Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66
Tux. L. REV. 577, 577-80 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for
Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 53-58 (David Kairys
ed., 1982); Stanchi, Resistance, supra note 3, at 21 n.83; Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at
1553 n.24 (listing sources). See generally Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal
Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REv. 193 (1991) (exploring whether a legal
education changes a student's moral perspective).
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possible so as to lead the reader to the desired conclusion. 12 The theory
is that the more a reader has to struggle to interpret the text or the more
interpretive options are given to the reader by the style of the text, the
more likely it is that the reader will bring her own ideas to the text.
When a writer's style allows or encourages the reader to bring her own
ideas or conclusions to the text, the chances increase that these ideas or
conclusions will vary from those that the writer is trying to advocate.
Thus, a style that permits great reader leeway in interpretation is
generally thought to be inconsistent with strong persuasive legal writing.
Overall, the persuasive legal writer seeks to eliminate or narrow the gap
between the text and possible interpretation. 13 Speaking of conventional
legal writing, one commentator has said that it "looks primarily
toward ... the disciplines of closure and away from the disciplines of
openness." 14
Similarly, many of the constraints or "rules" of persuasive legal
writing derive from the goal of making the audience comfortable, at
ease, and highly receptive to the message of the document. The theory
is that if the writer makes things easy for the reader and uses a style that
avoids requiring the reader to do a great deal of work to understand the
message, the reader's attention will be kept on the message of the
document and the reader will not be distracted by her struggle to
understand. 15 This also means that the reader is in a psychological state
12. See, e.g., STARK, supra note 7, at 22-23. One author goes so far as to
characterize this tactic as "coerc[ing]" the reader. Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
13. One commentator has put it this way: ''The lawyer's exposition will be clear,
orderly, linear, and paraphrasable. His audience will never be 'lost' and will never need
to ask 'what's the point?' or 'what is he driving at?' or 'where is he going?"' Wetlaufer,
supra note 7, at 1558; see also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING:
THEORIES AND S1RATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 98 (2002) (describing stylistic
strategies of persuasive writing as "medium mood control"). Some commentators have
argued that this quest of legal language is an empty or futile one, as no "language" can
be completely literal or stable. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 1-6
(1989). Perhaps, but in the culture oflaw, there is some significant agreement (whether
it is "true" or not) about what is "clear" writing and what is not. Whether the people we
call "skilled" or "good" lawyers are actually writing clearly, or we are all engaged in
some kind of group cognitive dissonance, is not dispositive for the advocate. Whether
our audience is fooling itself about what it believes is clear or not, the advocate must
cater to that belief. Moreover, language is not a monolith-it can be viewed as a
spectrum of instability in which no words have absolute literal or fixed meanings, but in
which some words have greater stability than others. See Richard A. Posner, Law and
Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1360-62 (1986).
14. Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1572; see also SMITH, supra note 13, at 98.
15. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL
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that makes her susceptible to the message of the document. Both of
these conditions, attentiveness and psychological susceptibility, are
generally viewed as favorable to the advocate. Along the same lines, the
reader's discomfort and unease is viewed as unfavorable. The harder a
reader has to work, the theory goes, the more likely it is that the reader
will ignore or gloss over key ideas, or even stop reading. And a reader's
negative reaction to the document or the writer (such as irritation,
discomfort, or guilt) can alienate the reader from the writer's arguments
or encourage the reader to stop reading the document.
The persuasive writer's twin goals of simultaneously controlling the
reader and making her comfortable mandate that persuasive legal writing
be direct, declarative, and simple. Thus, convention dictates that legal
writing should say what it means in the most unadorned, unambiguous
way . 16 Clarity is one of the most highly valued characteristics of
persuasive legal writing. 17 Although people, even lawyers, can certainly
differ about what clarity means, the conventional wisdom in law is that
there is a real difference between clear legal language and, for example,
literary language. 18 Legal language is said to be straightforward and
specific; literary language is vague, ambiguous, and unconstrained. 19
Thus, to the extent analogies, metaphors or other rhetorical devices are
used in legal writing, they should be simple and easy for the reader to
understand. 20
ARGUMENT 21 (rev. 1st ed. 1996); LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING:
PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 244-45 (1996); FAJANS & FALK, supra note 10,
at 66-67; SMITH, supra note 13, at 98; STARK, supra note 7, at 40-41.
16. See GIRVAN PECK, WRITING PERSUASIVE BRIEFS 23-26 (1984); STARK, supra
note 7, at 40-46; Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
17. See, e.g., Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really
Think About the Way La,wyers Write, 8 LEGAL WRITING (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript
on file with author) (documenting a survey of federal judges expressing a "strong,
recurring and unmistakable cry" for clarity and conciseness).
18. See Posner, supra note 13, at 1360-78 (contrasting the legal writing of
legislators with literary writing).
19. See id; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY
52-53 (1980) (contrasting "normal literal language" with '"figurative' or 'imaginative'
language").
20. See PECK, supra note 16, at 21(stating that metaphors and similes should be in
"concrete" language); SMITH, supra note 13, at 207-17 (cautioning against overuse of
metaphor and use of obscured or "forced" metaphor); STARK, supra note 7, at 37-38
(suggesting that imagery should be used sparingly). Essentially, the recommendation on
literary devices such as metaphors is that, in legal writing, their frequency and flourish
must be tightly controlled. That is, they should be used temperately and the comparison
should be obvious, not obscure. More obscure metaphors run the risk that the reader will
bring his own perspective to the metaphor. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at
52-55. Metaphors also have what linguists call "entailments" that flow from the
metaphor. Id. at 91. The more entailments a metaphor conjures, the more room there is
to interpret the meaning of the metaphor. Thus, the metaphor of love as a river calls up
the entailments of love as flowing, as pure, as beautiful. The more obscure the
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Clarity in persuasive writing means that the reader has little or no
room to reach conclusions other than the one advocated. This requires
that the words used should be simple to comprehend and easily
recognizable to other lawyers (thus, legal terms of art and jargon can be
acceptable because the audience will almost uniformly comprehend
them). 21 With a few exceptions, newly coined terms or overly complex
words violate both the control and ease rules: they create ambiguity and
may put off the reader who, feeling ignorant, has to run for the
dictionary. 22
The rules of control and ease also dictate the sparing use (if not
complete avoidance) of certain poetic or rhetorical devices that
encourage the reader's interaction with the text, and create a "gap"
between the text and the possible interpretations.23 These devices
include the classical rhetorical schemes of repetition, rhythm, and
inversion, which alter the usual, or conventional semantic rules.
Rhetorical schemes, like anaphora (repetition of the same word at the
beginning of successive clauses or sentences), chiasmus (reversal of
grammatical structures in successive phrases or clauses), and
antimetabole (repetition of words, in successive clauses, in reverse
grammatical order) are common in poetry, which generally invites
readers to bring themselves to the text to interpret meaning. 24 However,
metaphor, lhe more room lhe reader has to reach her own inferences. Even love as a
river (a fairly straightforward metaphor) could, for some, call up entailments of danger:
love could hurt you, or you could even drown and die in it.
21. One legal saying describes this as K.I.S.S. or '"keep it simple, stupid."'
Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
22. PECK, supra note 16, at 23-26 (cautioning against the use of "pompous" and
"trendy" jargon). Some lawyers refer to lhis stylistic tenet of persuasive legal writing as
lhe "in your seat rule"-lhe reader should not have to leave her seat to comprehend and
be persuaded by lhe document. If lhe reader must leave her seat to comprehend lhe
document, lhe advocate runs lhe risk of losing her attention, insulting her, or irritating
her, none of which help lhe advocate's cause.
23. See GERARD GENETIE, FIGURES OF LITERARY DISCOURSE 78 (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1982) (defining poetry, in relation to prose, as a "gap" in relation to lhe norm of
prose, as antiprose).
24. EDWARD P. J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR TIIE
MODERN STUDENT 390, 394-95 (41h ed. 1999). A classic example of anaphora is: "It is a
luxury, it is a privilege, it is an indulgence for those who are at lheir ease." Id. at 390
(quoting Letter from Edmund Burke to a Nobel Lord (1796)). Corbett refers to chiasmus
as "lhe criss-cross" because it is marked by grammatical inversion in successive phrases
or clauses, and illustrates by example: "It is hard to make money, but to spend it is easy."
Id. at 394-95. Antimetabole is similar, but involves both repetition and grammatical
inversion (for example: "One should eat to live, not live to eat"). Id. at 394 (quoting
Jean-Baptiste Poquelin Moliere, L'Avare).

393

despite the rhetorical power of these literary devices, the rules of
persuasive legal writing discourage their use, except sparingly, because
variation from conventional semantics can distract the reader, confuse
the document's message, and relinquish interpretive control to the
reader. 25
For similar reasons, persuasive legal writing generally favors positive
phrasing where possible. ("I am right" versus "you are wrong" or "I am
not wrong."). 26 Thus, in a brief, the "question presented" is best if
phrased to lead to the answer "yes" for the writer's client, and analogies
are most persuasive if they are direct and positive. Here again, the
writer strives to create in the reader a mental state that makes her most
receptive to the writer's conclusion. Negation, such as use of "no" or
"not," or the use of negative analogies, is presumed to be less attractive
to the reader; quite simply, it is nicer and easier for the reader if a
document makes her mentally say "yes" rather than "no." Positive
phrasing gives the reader a positive, agreeable feeling; negative phrasing
gives the reader a negative feeling. Positive examples and analogies
give writing strength and confidence; negative examples and analogies
appear defensive, even desperate. 27
This is one reason why, although most persuasive writing must use
some negation, rhetorical devices that are explicitly negative, such as
paradox, sarcasm, and irony, are highly disfavored in persuasive legal

25. See RAY & RAMSAELD, supra note 10, at 137, 257 (stating that metaphor and
idiom can be ambiguous and informal, and noting that repetition should be avoided
unless required for accuracy, readability, or emphasis); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note
10, at 331 (noting that devices such as metaphor and personification may be distracting);
SHAPO ET AL., supra note 10, at 323 (suggesting that a persuasive legal writer can use
metaphor, figurative language, and variations in tone and syntax, but not extensively).
But see PECK, supra note 16, at 48-50 (recommending grammatical variation based on
classical rhetorical techniques, as long as done artfully and with care); SMIIB, supra note
13, at 228 (encouraging some use of figurative speech but warning strongly against
overuse).
26. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 15, at 121 (indicating that effective statements
of issues in briefs should be positive and psychologically inclined in favor of your
client); JOHNS, supra note 10, at 169 (noting that affirmative language lends an assertive
tone to persuasive writing); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 137 (stating that
positive language is easier to understand and more likely to persuade); SHAPO ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 325, 328 (stressing the importance of clear and affirmative expressions
in briefs).
27. See, e.g., JOHNS, supra note 10, at 169 (suggesting that negative forms are
weak and easily misunderstood because the reader must figure out the positive form and
then negate it); RAY & RAMSAELD, supra note 10, at 175 (indicating that negative
statements are "easily misread" and "should be avoided"); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra
note 10, at 137 (stating that negative language and qualifying words reflect insecurity
and highlight vulnerable aspects of an argument); Laura E. Little, Characterization and
Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 372, 378 (1996) (noting that "direct negation has
limited persuasive power").
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writing. 28 In addition to being negative and therefore unappealing to the
reader, these rhetorical devices also create ambiguity and are highly
susceptible to misinterpretation in written language.29 Irony, the use of a
word or expression "in such a way as to convey a meaning opposite to
the literal meaning" of the word or expression, requires the writer to
know the beliefs, personality, and intelligence of her audience very
weU. 30 As a general matter, irony must be used with great caution (if at
all) in persuasive writing because the adversary system makes it difficult
to presume a commonality of beliefs between writer and audience, and
because within the adversary system it is rare that other clues to ironic
content (such as a personal relationship between speaker and listener)
can be employed.31
Similarly, sarcasm, slang, and humor are generally disfavored in
persuasive legal writing. Law is generally thought (by lawyers and judges) to
be a solemn, formal, and dignified language, which is demeaned by
overt rhetorical tricks, humor, and colloquial expressions.32 Moreo".er,
28. See, e.g., FAJANS & FALK, supra note 10, at 116 (suggesting that the deceitful
use of language such as sarcasm, mock humility, or fake candor is likely to damage the
author); RAY & RAMSAELD, supra note 10, at 268 (arguing that the writer should not use
sarcasm in legal writing because it is inappropriate and too easily taken literally, and
noting that sarcasm is only effective when the audience already agrees "whole-heartedly
with [the writer's] position"); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 313 (stating that
sarcasm is always inappropriate in legal writing); SHAPo ET AL., supra note 10, at 321
(noting that sarcasm, heavy irony, and hyperbole are inappropriate in brief writing).
29. See GENETIE, supra note 23, at 83 (stating that the gap between poetry and
prose carries out its poetic function as an "instrument of a change of meaning,"
switching from a "denotative," or intellectual reading, to a "connotative," or emotional
reading); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 819-21 (1995) (noting that irony, because its success
depends on the commonality of assumptions between author and reader, is risky in legal
writing), Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1572 (categorizing, among others, the disciplines of
rhetoric and Saussurian linguistics as "disciplines of openness" that appeal to the
emotions and imagination).
30. CORBETT, supra note 6, at 454-55; see Eastman, supra note 29, at 820 (noting
that irony requires the reader to "peer through" the ironic statement and understand that
the author means the opposite of what she said).
31. See SMITII, supra note 13, at 240 (warning that irony is not recommended for
legal writing because it is "too oblique and leaves too much room for miscommunication
and misunderstanding"); Eastman, supra note 29, at 819-21.
32. See ALDISERT, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that "ploys" that are effective with
juries, such as appeals to pity, ridicule, and popular opinion, have no place in appellate
courts); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 129 (legal writing is formal writing therefore
colloquialisms, slang, contradictions, and personal pronouns such as 'T' and "you" should be
avoided); SHAPO ET AL, supra note 10, at 321-22; STARK, supra note 7, at 36 (lawyers
should not inject themselves, or refer to their mental processes, in persuasive legal writing).
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sarcasm creates, as one commentator put it, a "clash" in tone that is
likely to alienate the reader; the "clash" of sarcasm tends to "raise
eyebrows, but not consciousness."33
Finally, most everything about persuasive legal writing-structure,
style, and substance-reflects the law's preference for rational,
objective, logical reasoning over subjectivity and emotion. The most
basic form of the advocate's argument is deductive, syllogistic
reasoning-conclusion, proof, explanation, conclusion. 34 Convention
strongly disfavors the use of "I" or any reference to the writer in a legal
document. 35 Accordingly, the prescribed legal form purposefully leaves
little room for personal narratives or appeals for sympathy and instead,
gives the legal document an aura of authority and objective truth that
leaves little room for doubt. 36 The form gives the lawyer maximum
control over the reader and gives the reader extremely limited
opportunity to interpret the text or stray from the message. 37
Moreover, persuasive legal writing disfavors direct appeals to
emotion; a good persuasive legal writer would never explicitly argue for
an outcome based on sympathy. 38 Emotional arguments are thought to
be the recourse of novice, untrained first-year law students, whose cries
of "it's not fair" in response to judicial opinions are (theoretically)
transformed by law school into reasoned, analytical proof. Outside the
classroom, in both persuasive legal writing and speaking, direct appeals
to emotion or sympathy are considered, at best, the last recourse of a
lawyer who has nothing else to argue. At worst, they are considered
evidence of poor lawyering skills and, depending on how they are made,
possibly unethical. For example, addressing a jury or panel of judges in
the second person, and inviting them to put themselves in the shoes of an
unfortunate client, is considered so inappropriate that it is sometimes
referred to as the "Golden Rule." 39 Appellate judges can be especially
33. SMITH, supra note 13, at 240 (stating that sarcastic or sardonic tone is
inconsistent with the professional tone required of legal writers); Eastman, supra note
28, at 821.
34. See NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 90; SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 3739, 113; STARK, supra note 7, at 128-30; Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
35. NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 402; Stanchi, Resistance, supra note 3, at 36;
Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
36. See, e.g., SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 130, 138; SHAPO ET AL., supra
note 10, at 73-74, 217, 239-40, 252; Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558.
37. See Wetlaufer, supra note 7, at 1558, 1568-72 (noting that deductive,
syllogistic logic serves the lawyer's purposes of coercion and closure).
38. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Exploring the Law of Law Teaching: A Feminist Process,
34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 193, 202-03 (2000) [hereinafter Stanchi, Exploring]; see also
NORMAN BRAND & JOHN 0. WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF PERSUASION
141-42 (1976) (calling direct appeals to emotion "fallacies" of argument").
39. Timothy J. Conner, What You May Not Say to the Jury, 27 LITIG., Spring 2001,
at 36, 37.

396

[VOL. 39: 387, 2002]

Feminist Legal Writing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

impatient with emotional arguments, considering such arguments to
imply that judges are susceptible to rash, irrational judgments as
opposed to considered, reasoned ones.40 If the centrality of audience
means anything in legal writing, it certainly means that the writer should
avoid insulting or angering her audience.
The law's distrust of overt emotion, however, does not mean that
emotion plays no role in persuasive legal writing. Indeed, appeals to
emotion, like pathos in Aristotelian rhetoric,41 play a key role in
persuasive legal writing. However, such appeals need to be subtle and
couched in one of the semantic forms acceptable to the law. Thus,
appeals to emotion can be disguised as or embedded in analogical
reasoning to be more palatable to the legal reader who is programmed to
dismiss them.42 Often, appeals to emotion can be subtly embedded in
the writer's characterization of facts-either the client's facts or the facts
of precedent.43 Emotion also plays an important role in the development
of the critical "theory of the case" for a trial or appeal.44 Traditional
legal scholarship tends to follow this pattern as well; it is common for an
article to begin with a strongly-worded factual example of the problem
sought to be solved by the legal analysis in the article.~5

40. See, e.g., JOHNS, supra note 10, at 202; NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 271-72,
277; RAY & RAMSFIELD, supra note 10, at 317 (noting that overly emotional tone
destroys credibility); SHAPO Er AL., supra note 10, at 303; see also Draper v. Airco, Inc.,
580 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[W]e do not expect advocacy to be devoid of
passion. . . . [However,] there must be limits to pleas of pure passion and there must be
restraints against blatant appeals to bias and prejudice.").
41. CORBETT, supra note 6, at 37, 86.
42. RONALD W AICUKAUSKI Er AL., THE WlNNlNG ARGUMENT 88-91 (2001) (noting
that advocates must appeal to the heart as well as the mind, but with subtlety and
restraint, especially in addressing an appellate court). The authors note that appeals to
emotion are most effective when combined with the logical reasons supporting the
advocate's position. Id. at 91; see also SHAPO Er AL., supra note 10, at 301-07; SMITH,
supra note 13, at 97 (stating that most lawyers use implied, not express, emotional
arguments in a briet). The law's ambivalence toward emotional arguments is evident in
one teaching text, which euphemizes appeals to emotion by referring to them as
"motivating arguments"-thereby avoiding the word "emotion" and characterizing them
using the legally acceptable term "argument." NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 271.
43. SMITH, supra note 13, at 96-97; Stanchi, Exploring, supra note 38, at 202-04.
44. The theory of the case is a set of facts chosen for both its emotional appeal and
its usefulness in the logical argument. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 271-81;
SCHUL1Z & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 293-97; SHAPO Er AL., supra note 10, at 263.
45. FAJANS & FALK, supra note 10, at 58 (stating that "[t]he paradigm most
common in legal scholarship is the problem-solution pattern").
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Despite the law's superficial distrust of emotion, convention permits,
even favors, placing emotional appeals in strategically significant
positions in legal documents, such as the first paragraph of a brief. 46 If
the writer chooses to highlight an emotional appeal structurally,
however, the writer must be especially subtle about the appeal-she
should avoid melodrama and hyperbole or she risks alienating the reader
or losing credibility. 47 She should also avoid any words or narrative
situations that might make the reader uncomfortable or disturbed.
In sum, persuasive legal language has explicit and fairly rigid conventions
familiar to lawyers and attractive to the legal audience. These conventions
dictate in large part how lawyers write, the substance of what they write,
how the merit of legal scholarship is judged, and how writing and analysis
are taught in law school. Many legal scholars have noted, however, that the
conventions of legal language limit greatly the substance of legal writing,
often to the detriment of outsiders.48 Linguists have noted that when
language fails in this way, the outsider group often creates a new language,
which is based on the dominant language but is more reflective of outsider
experience and is a linguistic way of flouting or opposing the conventions of
the dominant language. Linguist, M.A.K. Halliday called this phenomenon
"anti-language."49 In the next section, this Article describes the
sociolinguistic characteristics of antilanguage and shows how some
feminist legal scholarship uses a kind of legal antilanguage to persuade.
46. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 15, at 337 (stating that a "reader's attention
level is greatest in the first few paragraphs"); FAJANS & FALK, supra note 10, at 103, 106
(noting that the introduction must establish "the human and social context out of which
legal issues emerge"); NEUMANN, supra note 10, at 263, 265, 271-72, 274 (noting that
motivating arguments go first because people tend to read most carefully in the
beginning of a text); SCHULTZ & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 123 (arguing that a writer who
does not get to the point immediately will lose the reader); SHAPO ET AL., supra note 10,
at 263-64 (suggesting the writer start with a paragraph that elicits the reader's sympathy
or antipathy).
47. See Stanchi, Exploring, supra note 38, at 202-04.
48. "Outsider" has become something of a term of art to mean people traditionally
and historically excluded from the creation and practice of law. Mari Matsuda,
Affinnative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988). The limitations of legal language to express
outsider concerns and experiences have been noted by many feminist scholars. See, e.g.,
Finley, supra note 3, at 893; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives:
A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149,
149-54 (2000) [hereinafter West, Women's Hedonic Lives]; see also CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination (1984), in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON,
Difference]. This thesis-that language is essential to systems of oppression-is not
novel to feminist legal theory. See generally FOWLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (noting
that "sociolinguistic mechanisms" effectuate control by "the creation of an apparent
'natural world' in which inequitable relations and processes are presented as given and
inevitable").
49. Halliday, supra note 5, at 570.
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III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTILANGUAGE
Antilanguages are created by antisocieties (societies outside the
dominant society) to manage reality and create "counter-reality"; they
are languages that code a reality that is not real or important to the
dominant class and therefore has no vocabulary in the dominant
language.so Antilanguages are consciously oppositional to the dominant
society-a linguistic rebellion.s 1 It is characteristic of antilanguages that
only those within the antisociety can fully comprehend them: their
purpose is to solidify identity within the antisociety and exclude those in
the dominant society.s2 However, because antilanguages are formed by
groups that are both excluded by dominant culture and simultaneously
forced to live within it, antilanguages are derivative of the dominant
language.s3 Although by definition antilanguages are difficult for the
dominant class to comprehend, antilanguages do not entirely reject the
dominant language; the variation is usually "partial, not total."s4
Antilanguages share common linguistic characteristics. The most
basic feature of antilanguage is what linguists call relexicalization-the
substitution of new words for old ones or the creation of words for
particular things that have no word in the dominant language.ss
Relexicalization is important to antilanguage because it is a way of
recoding-and sometimes transforming-reality.56 Relexicalization can
also serve to code or create words for something that has no specific
word in the dominant language.57 So, for example, the antilanguage of
an underworld subculture may create a single word that means "to
swallow a stolen thing to avoid detection."58 In antilanguage,
relexicalization tends to occur primarily in areas "central to the activities
of the subculture and that set it off most sharply" from the dominant

50. ROBERT HODGE & GUNTIIER KREss, LANGUAGE AS IDEOLOGY 71-72 (2d ed.
1993); Halliday, supra note 5, at 570--71.
51. See Halliday, supra note 5, at 575.
52. HODGE & KREss, supra note 50, at 71-72.
53. Id.; Halliday, supra note 5, at 571.
54. Halliday, supra note 5, at 571.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., FOWLER Er AL., supra note 2, at 33.
57. See, e.g., Halliday, supra note 5, at 577.
58. Id. By using this example, which Halliday used in the original article outlining
his antilanguage theory, the author does not in any way mean to suggest that outsider
cultures are always or usually criminal or underworld cultures, although certainly that is
how the dominant society treats many of them.
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culture. 59 So, the same hypothetical underworld culture described above
may use the established dominant word for "house" but may have forty
different words for "police." 60 Thus, relexicalization defines the
subculture-it is a window on the culture's priorities.
Although relexicalization is a hallmark of antilanguage, the linguistic
form most characteristic of antilanguage is negation. 61 Negating some
aspect of dominant reality is the simplest way of rejecting that reality
and creating the counter-reality. 62 Negation is so central to oppositional
language that linguists have noted that a "poet or any other user of a
natural language can create an anti-world by using just one component
of a standard grammar, negation, simply denying or inverting statements
about reality." 63 Negation includes the use of negatives such as "no,"
"not," "none," "nothing" and the prefix "un." It can also take subtler
forms such as irony, oxymoron, and sarcasm, or words meaning "less
than," "weaker," or words of denial. 64 Linguists Gunther Kress and
Robert Hodge use John Donne's poem, A Nocturnal upon St. Lucy's
Day, Being the Shortest Day, as an example of the use of the tool of
negation:
'Tis the year's midnight, and it is the day's,
Lucy's, who scarce seven hours herself unmasks,
The sun is spent, and now his flasks
Send forth light squibs, no constant rays;
The world's whole sap is sunk:
The general balm th'hydroptic earth hath drunk,
Whither, as to the bed's-feet, life is shrunk,
Dead and interred; yet all these seem to laugh,
Compared with me, who am their epitaph.65

In this excerpt from the poem, Donne uses components that Hodge
and Kress characterize as direct negation, such as the prefix "un"
("unmasks") and the word "no" ("no constant rays"). The excerpt also
uses many more subtle forms of negation, including "scarce" (less than
the norm), "spent" (which here means finished, out of energy), "light
squibs" (here contrasted with "constant rays," so meaning less than
strong), "sunk" (referring to the world's "whole sap") and "shrunk,
[d]ead and interred" (referring to life). Donne also uses oxymoron-the
59. Id. at 571.
60. Id.
These examples are paraphrased from Halliday's study of actual
antilanguage culture, but were simplified for ease of the reader.
61. HODGE & KRESS, supra note 50, at 73.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 73-74. Hodge and Kress refer to words "like scarce and light" as
"partial negatives." Id. at 74.
65. Id. at 72 (quoting JOHN DONNE, A NOCTIJRNAL UPON ST. LUCY'S DAY, BEING
THE SHORTEST DAY).
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day's "midnight" and life as "dead and interred." 66 The overall effect is
profoundly negative, a picture of a day of death and darkness.
The form of negation that joins a negative with a positive, as with
oxymoron and paradox, is a classic tool of antilanguage because it often
can have the effect of imbuing that which is negative in the dominant
culture with positive attributes ("Hell's angels" for example).67 In
antilanguage, the result is a rebellion encapsulated in one, short phrase:
it takes something classified as negative in the dominant society and
imbues it with positive traits, which rejects the disapproval of the
dominant society. At the same time it uses the positive word, but
negates it, which has the effect of both reflecting and rejecting the values
of the dominant culture.68 For example, the phrase "Hell's angels"
reclassifies hell as positive and angel as negative, "incorporating the
negative judgment of society and [the Hell's angels'] own positive
judgment on themselves into a single ambiguous unit." 69
Negation can also be used to defy or reject the traditional or
conventional way that things and beings are classified in the dominant
language. This type of negation, called "reclassification," is a common
characteristic of antilanguages.70
Reclassification is a way of
linguistically expressing opposition to the dominant culture by attacking
its classification system. In doing so, it rejects the "fundamental
categories in the science/grammar of the dominant language" and creates
an antiworld of opposite categories.71 In the Donne excerpt, Donne's
oxymoron of "day's" midnight and dead "life" defy the classification of
positives and negatives that exist in English. In English, there is no such
thing as the midnight of "day"; midnight occurs at night. Midnight also
marks the boundary of two days and therefore cannot be said to belong
to one day or the other.72 Similarly, "life" cannot be "dead" in English.
Something is either dead, or it is alive; it cannot be both. Thus, Donne
uses language to create or describe an antiworld where what he describes
can happen-life is dead and midnight does belong to day. The
oxymoron, "Hell's Angels", is a similar type of reclassification.

66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74.
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Another typical form of reclassification refers to humans in a way that
classifies them as objects or as unreal. 73 An excellent example of this is
contained in the last two lines of the Donne excerpt, where he writes that
"all these seem to laugh, [c]ompared with me, who am their epitaph."74
In English, both "who" and "laugh" always refer to an animate being,
and "laugh" almost always refers to an activity of living human beings. 75
In Donne's antiworld, however, things are reclassified and reorganized
so that our fundamental preconceptions are challenged: dead things
"laugh" and animate things are inanimate (epitaphs). This kind of
reclassification is a way of using language to turn what is known or
sacred in the (dominant) world upside-down, thereby creating an
antiworld that challenges the fundamental categories of the dominant
world. 76
The final characteristic of antilanguage identified by Halliday is use of
metaphor. Because antilanguages create a new counter-reality, metaphorical
modes of expression are the norm. This distinguishes antilanguages
from dominant languages, where metaphoric expressions are frequent
but are nevertheless a linguistic variation. 77 Because metaphors and
metaphorical compounds are a way of "understanding and experiencing
one kind of thing in terms of another," 78 they are not simply an artistic
embellishment in antilanguages, but are necessary to express the
counter-reality of an antisociety. Thus, metaphors, rhyming alterations,
and other linguistic variations are standard in antilanguages. 79 The use
of paradox, irony, and oxymoron can fit within this category as well.
N. FEMINIST LEGAL ANTILANGUAGE

This part of the Article examines examples of feminist legal writing
that exhibit the characteristics of antilanguage and posits that the use of
these devices makes the writing a legal antilanguage. 80 The techniques
73. Id. at 75.
74. Id. at 72, 75.
75. Id. at 75.
76. Id.
77. Halliday, supra note 5, at 579.
78. See LAKOFF& JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
79. See Halliday, supra note 5, at 578 ("It is this metaphorical character that
defines the anti-language. An anti-language is a metaphor for an everyday language; and
this metaphorical quality appears all the way up and down the system.").
80. The feminist legal scholarship discussed in this Article was chosen for its use
of the rhetorical techniques that are common in antilanguage, that contravene the
generally accepted rules of persuasive legal writing, and that, by doing so, add power
and persuasive value to the feminist message of the scholarship. This Article does not
mean to suggest that feminist legal scholarship not written in antilanguage is somehow
less feminist, or that every scholar who uses these devices can be characterized as either
feminist or as employing an antilanguage.
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identified by Halliday as the general hallmarks of antilanguage, such as
relexicalization, negation, use of metaphor, and reclassification, also
violate some of the central conventions of legal language. Thus, their
use is indicative of a legal antilanguage.
Relexicalization, for example, breaks from the conventions of persuasive
legal writing because it purposefully creates distance between the text
and the conventional legal reader, and thereby violates the rules of
control and ease. Use of negation and reclassification in persuasive legal
writing also places a text firmly outside convention. Negative phrasing
and logic flout legal writing's convention that positive equals strength
and negative equals weakness. It also rejects the conventional theory
that readers prefer the positive and will be more susceptible to an
argument phrased in the positive. Moreover, negation that creates
ambiguity, such as oxymoron, irony, or paradox, violates both the rule
against negativity and the rule against relinquishing interpretive control
to the reader.
Finally, the extensive use of poetic devices and syntactical variation,
as well as certain uses of metaphor and simile, defy the conventions of
persuasive legal writing because they can make a text more difficult to
interpret or understand, and thereby risk irritating or confusing the
audience or leaving the audience too much room to interpret the
document. Finally, while not part of Halliday antilanguage, the overt
use of emotion and the use of first and second-person narrative
standpoint in feminist legal writing are defiant enough of the rules of
conventional legal writing to be indicative of a legal antilanguage. Overt
emotion and a shifting-narrative standpoint perform essentially the same
antilanguage function in legal writing that those techniques identified by
Halliday perform in language generally: they resist the stylistic
constraints of the dominant language by twisting or subverting the rules
of the dominant syntax. 81

81. Applying the linguistic theory of antilanguage to legal writing takes some
liberties with the term as it is used in linguistics and anthropological literature.
Nevertheless, the application works. Antilanguage is a term of art, but, as would be
expected with any theory as applied to a thing as ever-changing and fluid as language, it
is a flexible term. Antilanguages exist on a spectrum-small dialectical variations in the
dominant language are a version of antilanguage, as are languages that employ so many
of the variations associated with antilanguage that the transformation from the dominant
language is almost total. See Halliday, supra note 5, at 580 (noting that there probably
has never been such a thing as a total antilanguage, that is, one that is a completely
distinct tongue from the dominant language).

403

Given what we know about antilanguage, it should not surprise us that
characteristics of Halliday antilanguage and legal antilanguage appear in
feminist legal scholarship. Feminist legal scholarship is a voice of feminist
legal culture. Feminist legal culture, as wide and diverse and contradictory
as it can be, is a legal "anticulture" in that it and its adherents are in many
ways "outside" mainstream law and legal academia. 82 And, as with any
antilanguage, in feminist legal scholarship we see a spectrum of linguistic
choices, from pieces that use quite conventional legal writing and vary only
slightly (if at all) from the constraints of typical persuasive legal writing, to
other pieces that break all the rules, or break them in such a way as to take
the language firmly outside the dominant legal language oflaw. 83
The differences between feminist legal antilanguage and Halliday
antilanguage are directly related to the dilemma faced by feminist legal
advocacy of having to choose between subversive or persuasive language.
That is, unlike Halliday antilanguage, which departs from the dominant
tongue to insulate the anticulture and exclude the dominant class, the use
of antilanguage in the feminist legal writing analyzed here serves a
somewhat different purpose. Although feminist legal antilanguage can
sometimes be insulating and exclusive, 84 the devices used in feminist
antilanguage often serve as rhetorical tools-to convey, and persuade
others of, the feminist message of the writing. Although the messages of
the writings analyzed here vary greatly, in each piece the use of legal
antilanguage is inextricably tied to the feminist message of the writing.
In the subsequent Sections, the following characteristics are used to
analyze examples of feminist legal antilanguage: (A) relexicalization;
(B) negation, including use of oxymoron, paradox, irony, sarcasm, and
reclassification; (C) poetic devices, such as schemes of repetition and
rhythm, syntactical inversions, and metaphor; and (D) first and second
person narrative standpoint and overt appeals to emotion.

82. In using the phrase "feminist legal culture," the author does not mean to
"essentialize" feminism or feminist legal theory. Feminism is diverse and constantly
changing. However, it is fair to say that many-including many feminist legal
scholars-view feminists as "outsiders" and feminist legal theory as "outside" the
mainstream of law. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 297, 298 (1992);
Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium: A Hard Party to Crash for Crits, Feminists
and Other Outsiders, 71 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 989,990 (1996).
83. Perhaps predictably, the tension between antilanguage and convention in
feminist legal theory mirrors the substantive theoretical conflicts within feminist legal
theory. The writing (the medium) is inseparable from the message (the substance).
After all, the concept of feminist legal theory is itself something of an oxymoron.
Unmodified, "legal theory" is understood as mainstream, conventional legal theory: that
is, not feminist (perhaps even masculinist). Thus, a legal theory that is different, that is
feminist, requires the modifier and creates something of a contradiction.
84. See Halliday, supra note 5, at 575.
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A. Relexicalization
Relexicalization is a common tool of feminist legal writing and has
accompanied (if not partially caused) the broadening of legal culture and
the creation of new legal concepts or causes of action. Feminist legal
scholars have long recognized the importance of "naming" experiences
for which there are no words in legal culture as a way of validating
women's experiences and making them real. 85
While Halliday
antilanguage uses relexicalization to exclude the dominant class,
however, relexicalization in feminist legal antilanguage is used primarily
to bring concepts otherwise invisible to the dominant class of law to its
attention. 86 Although relexicalization is used as a tool of advocacy, its
use as a rhetorical tool nevertheless reveals the tension in feminist legal
antilanguage between rebellion and persuasion.
For example, in her ground-breaking article on battering, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, Martha
Mahoney sets out to consciously change cultural and legal attitudes
toward battered women by labeling as "separation assault" the violence
that women commonly experience when they try to leave battering
relationships. 87 Mahoney explains that despite the commonality of this
experience:
We have had neither cultural names nor legal doctrines specifically tailored to
the particular assault on a woman's body and volition that seeks to block her
from leaving, retaliate for her departure, or forcibly end the separation. I
propose that we name this attack "separation assault."
... As with other assaults on women that were not cognizable until the
feminist movement named and explained them, separation assault must be
identified before women can recognize our own experience and before we can
develop legal rules to deal with this particular sort of violence.
. . . [L]aw reform r~uires such an approach to simultaneously reshape
cultural understanding. 88

Persuasion is easiest when it can be accomplished through understanding
based on shared experience; it is much more difficult to do through
85. See, e.g., West, Women's Bedonie Lives, supra note 48, at 154 ("It is hard to
talk about [women's] pain and pleasure .... Our language is inadequate to the task.").
86. See id. (noting that women "still lack the descriptive vocabulary necessary to
convey the quality of the pain we sustain"). This use of relexicalization reflects the
significant investment feminist legal theorists have in reaching, as opposed to alienating,
members of the dominant legal culture.
87. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1991 ).
88. Id. at 6--7 (footnotes omitted).
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communication of unshared experience. 89 In a legal culture where the
power lies largely with white, heterosexual men, and the language is
reflective of their experiences alone, new words are required to tell the
story of women's experiences. 90 Each word or phrase, like "separation
assault," is code for an experience, a way of sharing that experience with
someone who has not had it, and ultimately, a way of persuading another
of the validity of the experience.
Another example of this is Patricia Williams's concept of "spirit
murder," a phrase she uses to describe the distinct and devastating injury
of racism. 91 There is no word in either American or legal culture that
describes the obliterating hurt of racism-that describes, as Williams
writes, living in a culture of fear and hate, in a society with "disregard
for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard."92 Williams
consciously uses the violent and loaded term "murder" to describe what
racism does. Murder is an irreversible act of violence, an act universally
deplored by society and in law (as racism should be); it is perhaps the
most serious criminal act a person can commit. 93 Juxtaposed next to
"spirit,"94 the phrase evokes the purposeful killing of dreams, ambition,
optimism, and hope. The relexicalized spirit murder is a way of
communicating, of sharing, what racism is and does with those who
have not experienced it.
In addition to giving voice to experiences not acknowledged by law,
feminist legal writers also use relexicalization to bring to the law
cultures and ethnicities historically excluded. In one piece of feminist
legal scholarship, for example, Margaret Montoya brings Latina culture
to the law and legal writing when she retells the case of People v.
Chavez, 95 incorporating Spanish words into her discussion. 96 People v.
Chavez is a case Montoya encountered in criminal law class in law
school. 97 The case involved a Latina girl, Josephine Chavez, who was
89. See generally Singer, supra note 8.
90. See West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 48, at 149, 154.
91. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 73 (1991).
Williams notes that racism is only one form of spirit murder; "'cultural obliteration,
prostitution, abandonment of the elderly and the homeless, and genocide are some of its
other guises." Id.
92. Id. The word "discrimination" does not even begin to cover the complexity
and quality of pain inflicted by racism.
93. Note that analogizing racism to murder is also a kind of metaphor. See infra
notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
94. This also makes the phrase something of an oxymoron. See supra notes 67-69
and accompanying text.
95. 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
96. Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Greiias: Un/masking the Self
While Un/braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185,
201-05 (1994).
97. Id. at 201.
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charged with manslaughter after giving birth to a baby over the toilet in
the bathroom of her mother's home. 98 Josephine hid the pregnancy from
her family and, after giving birth without waking any family members,
retrieved the baby from the toilet and hid the baby under the bathtub. 99
Montoya remembers the legal issue discussed in class as centering on
whether the baby had been born alive for purposes of the California
manslaughter statute. 100
Montoya first reprints the facts from the Chavez opinion-facts
related in a flat, sterile way, seemingly devoid of empathy and emotion,
with no reference to Josephine's ethnicity and only passing reference to
her gender and the extreme poverty in which she lived. 101 Montoya
writes:
I long to hear Josephine Chavez's story told in what I will call Mothertalk
and Latina-Daughtertalk. Mothertalk is about the blood and mess of
menstruation, about the every month-ness of periods or about the fear in the pit
of the stomach and the ache in the heart when there is no period. Mothertalk is
about the blood and mess of pregnancy, about placentas, umbilical cords and
stitches. Mothertalk is about sex and its effects ....
Latina-Daughtertalk is about feelings reflecting the deeply ingrained
cultural values of Latino families: in this context, feelings of vergiienza de
sexualidad ("sexual shame"). Sexual experience comes enshrouded in sexual
shame; have sex and you risk being known as sinvergiienza, shameless.
Another Latina-Daughtertalk value is respeto a la mama y respeto d lafamilia.
Familias are not nuclear nor limited by blood ties; they are extended, often
including foster siblings and comadres y compadres, madrinas y padrinos
(godmothers, godfathers and other religion linked-relatives).
Josephine Chavez's need to hide her pregnancy ... can be explained by a
concern about the legal consequences as well as by the vergiienza within and of
her familia that would accompany the discovery of the pregnancy, a pregnancy
that was at once proof and reproof of her sexuality. Josephine's unwanted
pregnancy would likely have been interpreted within her community and her
familia and by her mother as a lack of respeto. 102

The words Montoya uses to describe the facts of Chavez are not new in
the same way as "spirit murder" or "date rape" (they are and have long
been part of the Spanish language), but they are both new words and
new concepts for American law. One of Montoya's principal points in
Mascaras is that American law and legal discourse have excluded Latina
culture and cultural concepts (as well as Spanish words). Even while
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 204-05 (footnotes omitted).
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imposing on Josephine Chavez a criminal law based on the experiences
of white men, the law regards Josephine's Latinaness and her
womanness as irrelevant; they cannot be raised acceptably in legal
discourse. 103 Montoya resists this through partial relexicalizationthrough a retelling of Josephine's story that weaves into the legal facts
Spanish words and concepts (which bring with them Latina culture).
Relexicalization is useful as a feminist rhetorical tool because, in law,
there is no remedy without damage, and there is no damage if there is no
word for the hurt or pain. Moreover, the remedy will necessarily be
inadequate if the word for the damage does not convey the full extent of
the hurt. Consequently, the first step in crafting an adequate remedy is
naming the experience. Thus, although it can be alienating and ambiguous,
and therefore indicative of legal antilanguage, relexicalization sometimes
serves rhetorical purposes and may sometimes be necessary to feminist
advocacy.
B. Negation: Irony, Paradox, Sarcasm, and Reclassification

Like relexicalization, negation in feminist legal writing can be both an
indicator of legal antilanguage and a tool of persuasion. Negation may
often be the most accurate tool to describe women's experiences within
patriarchy, which Robin West explicitly calls "profoundly negative." 104
The use of negative rhetorical devices such as oxymoron and irony may
also be the product of writing (an exercise of power) about women's
experiences of powerlessness. Speaking out or writing about one's
feelings of forced silence or invisibility is something of a paradox.
Interestingly, while the use in feminist legal writing of paradox, irony,
sarcasm, and oxymoron might flout legal convention, these negative
devices are also classical rhetorical figures of speech that in the past
were common in persuasive writing and speaking. 105 The use of
somewhat "out of fashion" rhetorical devices in feminist legal
antilanguage is an example of how antilanguage draws from, but alters,
the dominant language. 106
Reclassification is a form of negation that can be quite useful to the
feminist advocate. Feminist legal writing must frequently describe and
103. Id. at 204.
104. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGALF. 59, 61.
105. See CORBETT, supra note 6, at 306, 454-57.
106. Legal advocacy was not always devoid of classical, even flamboyant, rhetoric.
However, convention has changed (the audience has changed), and this is no longer a
suggested or appropriate style. STARK, supra note 7, at 199 (characterizing the legal
rhetoric of Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan as "histrionic" and wryly
suggesting that Prozac is the cause of today's more subdued rhetoric).
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communicate experiences mostly unique to women to an audience
largely comprised of people who have not had these experiences and
whose vision of the world may not include such experiences. 107
Changing the way the world looks to someone entails classifying the
world in a new or different way; thus, the writing will likely reclassify
things and people.
Negation abounds in Catharine MacKinnon' s definitive antipomography
text, Only Words. 108 For a piece of legal advocacy, Only Words is a very
negative text. MacKinnon uses paradox, oxymoron, irony, and sarcasm
almost exclusively when she is describing women's reality, women's
voices, and women's perspectives. This is common in antilanguage,
where the issues central to the antisociety tend to be where the most
drastic linguistic variation takes place. 109 In Only Words, the negation
takes place within the confines of an otherwise fairly conventional and
persuasive legal argument, illustrating the tension between persuasion and
resistance in MacKinnon' s feminist legal writing.
MacKinnon's legal argument uses a classical tactic of Aristotelian
logos also commonly used in legal advocacy: statistics as evidence of a
conclusion. 110 She also describes the history of the pornography debatehow it came to pass that pornography was cemented as a question of
First Amendment protected free expression. m She uses a typical tool of
legal argumentation-refonnulating the question presented-to challenge the
way the central legal question in the pornography debate has been
framed. 112 She then uses basic legal analogical reasoning to show how
her framing of the pornography debate is more consistent with other
laws involving both speech and acts:
Saying "kill" to a trained attack dog is only words. Yet it is not seen [in the
law] as expressing the viewpoint "I want you dead"-which it usually does, in
fact, express. It is seen as perfonning an act tantamount to someone's
destruction, like saying "ready, aim, fire" to a firing squad. Under bribery
statutes, saying the word "aye" in a legislative vote triggers a crime that can
consist entirely of what people say. So does price-fixing under the anti-trust

107. See, e.g., West, Women's Bedonie Lives, supra note 48, at 149-51.
108. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
109. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
110. CORBETT, supra note 6, at 22-23; MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 7.
111. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 8-9.
112. Id. at 11 (stating that under the "approach of current law, pornography is
essentially treated as defamation rather than as discrimination"). Attempting to control
the legal conclusion by reframing the legal question is one of the most basic weapons in
the advocate's arsenal. See Little, supra note 27, at 392.
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laws. "Raise your goddamn fares twenty percent, I'll raise mine the next
morning" is not protected speech; it is attempted joint monopolization, a "highly
verbal crime." In this case, conviction nicely disproved the defendant's
view ... that "we can talk about any goddamn thing we want to talk about." 113

This list of examples makes the framing of pornography as protected
speech stand out as a peculiar exception. The antitrust example
especially, coming as it does from a reported case, is a classic example
of basic analogical legal reasoning. 114
Within what looks in many ways (structurally and strategically) like a
typical piece of persuasive legal writing, however, MacKinnon infuses
numerous types of negation, primarily oxymoron, paradox, and negative
analogy. For example, the oxymoronic concept of women's silent, unheard
voices is a linguistic theme that runs throughout Only Words and indeed,
through much of MacKinnon's other legal writing as well. 115 The
negativity and ambiguity created by this paradoxical theme mark
MacKinnon's language as a legal antilanguage and are the only ways for
MacKinnon to explore her theme that women's voices are unheard and
unbearable. Thus, MacKinnon describes women as living their whole
lives "surrounded by [a] cultural echo of nothing where your screams
and your words should be." 116 Women's speech, she writes, using a
negative simile, is "like shouting at a movie . . . . The action onscreen
continues as if nothing has been said." 117
The silence of women's voices is only part of women's existence in an
anticulture, which MacKinnon describes in entirely paradoxical and
oxymoronic terms, using "you" to refer only to women:
You learn that language does not belong to you, that you cannot use it to say
what you know, that knowledge is not what you learn from your life, that
information is not made out of your experience. You learn that thinking about
what happened to you does not count as "thinking," but doing it apparently
does. You learn that your reality subsists somewhere beneath the socially

113. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 12.
114. SMITH, supra note 13, at 258 (noting that analogical reasoning, also called
"case comparison reasoning," involves comparing the facts of a precedent case to the
facts of a new case) (citing LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS,
ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 4-8 (2d ed. 1999)).
115. Part of MacKinnon's dominance theory is that feminism must be the voice of
women's silence (itself an oxymoron). Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 639 (1983)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism].
116. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 3 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 6; see also id. at 8 (noting that the pornography question was framed "in
the absence of the words of sexually abused women, in the vacuum of this knowledge, in
the silence of this speech").
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real-totally exposed but invisible, screaming yet inaudible, thought about
incessantly yet unthinkable, "expression" yet inexpressible, beyond words. 118

This excerpt contains many examples of what Hodge and Kress call
direct negation: the word "not" and the negative prefixes "un"and "in"
are used a total of ten times in three short sentences. Other more subtle
forms of negation also appear, such as the words "subsist," "beneath,"
and "beyond," which are all used in this excerpt to mean "less than" and
to highlight the lower position of women existing (subsisting) under
male dominance.
This same excerpt also uses another form of negation, reclassification,
to describe the antiworld that women experience as life under patriarchy.
In the excerpt, certain fundamental categories of the dominant (male)
culture-what is expressed is language, what is known is truth, what is
experienced is real, and what is spoken is heard-are reclassified. In
dominant culture, these statements are so true that they are not worth
saying. However, in the world of women, language is not language, reality
is not real, knowledge is not knowledge, and sounds are inaudible. 119
Similarly, in Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State, MacKinnon
uses both reclassification and oxymoron to describe what feminism
does:
Feminism claims the voice of women's silence, the sexuality of our eroticized
desexualization, the fullness of "lack," the centrality of our marginality and
exclusion, the public nature of privacy, the presence of our absence. This
approach is more complex than transgression, more transformative than
transvaluation, deeper than mirror-imaged resistance, more affirmative than the
negation of our negativity. 120

This list of almost entirely oxymoronic phrases demonstrates how
male dominance is so "metaphysically nearly perfect" 121 that within it
women are not yet "real" or fully human; they are objects, barely visible
and inaudible. They are "sex" itself or sexual property fought over by
men. 122 Feminism reverses this world-turns it upside-down so that
118. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
119. See MACKINNON, Difference, supra note 48, at 39. Speaking of women under
male dominance, MacKinnon writes: "You aren't just deprived of a language with which
to articulate your distinctiveness, although you are; you are deprived of a life out of
which articulation might come." Id.
120. MacKinnon, Feminism, supra note 115, at 639.
121. Id. at 638.
122. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 9 (noting that, when women become "real,"
they will change from being "sex" to being "human being[s] gendered female").
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marginality is central, silence is voiced, absence is present. Thus,
MacKinnon's language reclassifies women (as not hearable or sexual,
lacking the traits that all humans have) as well as the world (as a place
where such paradoxes are commonplace), making her writing, and her
message, powerful-not in spite of, but because of, its eerie negativity.
Patricia Williams also makes use of reclassification and paradox to
demonstrate to her readers the crazy and upside-down world created by
racism and sexism. In her discussion of the Tawana Brawley case, 123
Williams notes that Tawana disappeared, silenced, among the shouting
voices of the black men who were speaking for her and the white men
who were trying to discredit her (and her spokesmen). 124 In a classic
version of reclassification that recalls the John Donne poem analyzed by
Hodge and Kress, Williams describes Tawana in this context as a human
being who has been almost completely obliterated and negated:
Tawana Brawley herself remains absent from all this. She is a shape, a hollow,
an emptiness at the center. Joy Kogawa's "white sound":
There is a silence that cannot speak.
There is a silence that will not speak.
Beneath the grass the speaking dreams and beneath the dreams is a
sensate sea. The speech that frees comes forth from that amniotic deep. To
attend its voice, I can hear it say, is to embrace its absence. But I fail the
task. The word is stone. 125

Williams's words "absent," "hollow," and "emptiness" are all words
of negation, and Williams uses them to show how the various forces of
the world worked to make Tawana Brawley, a young, victimized black
girl, into a nothing-not merely not a person, but a void. The poem
itself is also filled with negation and paradox, and it reinforces the
negation and reclassification in Williams' writing.
Later, Williams' description of the Brawley incident is a nearly
textbook definition of reclassification: "untruth becomes truth through
belief, and disbelief untruths the truth. The world turns upside-down;
the quiet, terrible, nearly invisible story of her suffering may never
emerge from the clamor ...." 126 Using reclassification and paradox,
Williams shows the reader a world where human beings are ethereal
nothings, where truth is untruth and the whole world is upside-down. In
123. Tawana Brawley was a fifteen-year-old black girl who, in late 1987, was found
in a vacant lot, partly naked, in a garbage bag, with dog feces and urine on her body and
the words "KKK" and "nigger" etched into her torso. She became the center of a media
and social controversy when she identified several white men, including the district
attorney of Wappinger Falls, New York (where she lived) and a police officer, as the
men who had assaulted and raped her. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 169-71.
124. Id. at 170-74.
125. Id. at 175 (quoting Joy K0GAWA, OBASAN epigraph (1981)).
126. Id. at 176.
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this way she paints a vivid picture-again far more vivid and troubling
than conventional prose would be-to show the reader (really to have
the reader almost experience herself) what the world is for a fifteenyear-old black girl raped and horribly abused (over and over) by white
men and white culture.
In another chapter of The Alchemy of Race and Rights, Williams uses
a more subtle, but still effective, version of reclassification. She offers
to the reader a vignette about a "lone black man" who shoots several
young white students on an elevator, intending, he says, to murder them,
because he claims that he could tell from the students' "body language"
and "shiny eyes and big smiles" that they meant to hurt him. 127 She then
tells her reader that "with minor character alterations," the vignette is
really the story of Bernhard Goetz, a white middle-aged man who shot
four young, unarmed African-American men in a New York City
subway station when they approached him and, according to him, tried
to panhandle money from him. 128 Goetz became something of a
vigilante hero among many white residents of New York City, who
identified with Goetz' s instantaneous fear of being alone in the subway
with four young black men.
In this story, Williams reclassifies the categories "black" and "white."
In doing so, Williams compels her white readers to realize how race
affects their interpretation of the event. Through this racial
reclassification of the world, Williams turns the white world upsidedown for a moment, to show, quite effectively, that race matters (no
matter what the law or anybody else says) and to force her white readers
to confront their own racism. It is a very persuasive rhetorical device,
with a far greater impact than if Williams had written an analytical piece
arguing that identification with Goetz is racist, that those who do
identify with Goetz do so partially because of their fear of black people,
and that therefore the Goetz verdict was racist and so on. 129 Yet, it is a
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. at 76-77. Williams writes that the vignette is a pastiche of Goetz's own
words from his videotaped confession. Id. at 77.
129. After a trial, Bernhard Goetz was acquitted of all charges, including four
counts of attempted murder, and convicted only of a minor weapons charge. Goetz
Cleared in Shooting: Convicted of Illegally Owning a Gun, MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRIB.,
June 17, 1987, at IA. Goetz reportedly fired four shots, noted that one of his victims
was still alive, and then shot him again, saying ''You seem to be all right. Here's
another." Id. Goetz partially paralyzed and brain damaged one of his victims, id., who
later sued him civilly and won a forty-three million dollar judgment. Goetz Will File for
Bankruptcy, AssOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 28, 1996, 1996 WL 4422188.
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device that probably would not be acceptable in conventional legal
writing. From a linguistic and advocacy perspective, the question is,
why is this unacceptable if it would work to persuade where other
methods might fail? 130
In addition to reclassification and oxymoron, negation in feminist
legal writing often takes the form of irony and sarcasm. In Susan
Estrich's Rape, 131 for example, Estrich's narrative breaks two cardinal
conventions oflegal advocacy: it is a first-person subjective story, 132 and
it is infused with irony and sarcasm. In describing her initial encounter
with the police, she explains: "They asked me if he took any money ....
He did take money; that made it an armed robbery. Much better than
rape. They got right on the radio with that." 133 Similarly, in describing
her experience looking at mug shots, Estrich states: "No one had ever
told me that if you're raped, you should not shut your eyes and cry for
fear that this really is happening. You should keep your eyes open
focusing on this man who is raping you so you can identify him when
you survive." 134 Finally, in discussing the subject that led to the title of
the piece, Estrich writes:
I learned, much later, that I had "really" been raped. Unlike, say, the woman
who claimed she'd been raped by a man she actually knew, and was with
voluntarily. Unlike, say, women who are "asking for it," and get what they
deserve. I would listen as seemingly intelligent people explained these
distinctions to me, and marvel; later I read about them in books, court opinions,
and empirical studies. It is bad enough to be a "real" rape victim. How terrible
to be-what to call it-a "not real" rape victim. 135

This paragraph demonstrates an especially artful use of irony-and
more than a bit of sarcasm-placing this part of Estrich' s text within the
definition of legal antilanguage. The first three sentences set out the
130. Perhaps some lawyers and judges might be tempted to refer to Williams'
method as a "trick," a not-quite-above-board method of deceiving the reader as a means
to an end. However, this begs the question. Much of conventional legal advocacy
involves some deception-substituting "misled" for "lied," or using the passive voice to
conceal the actor, among many, many others-to reach the greater goal of advocacy and
zealous representation of the client. Williams' method might be different in some
substantive way, but we need to ask how it is different and why we are allowed to use
some deceptive or psychologically manipulative devices and not others.
131. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALEL.J. 1087 (1986).
132. In the law, such an account is generally thought to convey bias, not particular
knowledge. It is also thought to be too emotional for legal analysis. Estrich addresses
this convention later in the piece and tries to retool her narrative as ethically responsible,
if not necessary: "I cannot imagine anyone writing an article on prosecutorial discretion
without disclosing that he or she had been a prosecutor. I cannot imagine myself writing
on rape without disclosing how I learned my first lessons or why I care so much."
Estrich, supra note 131, at 1089.
133. Id. at 1087-88.
134. Id. at 1088.
135. Id.
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distinction about which Estrich wants to make a point. The reader gets a
subtle clue of the intended irony by the repetition (the classical
anaphora) of words in the second and third sentences as well as the
colloquial "say" interjected into the sentences. However, Estrich leaves
no doubt about her feelings by combining the quotation marks around
the "really" in the first sentence and the "not real" in the last, the
reference to "seemingly intelligent people" and the author's reaction
("marvel"), and the interjected, somewhat derisive, "what to call it." In
this short, highly effective paragraph, Estrich makes her point clearly
and persuasively, while breaking some of the cardinal rules of advocacy.
MacKinnon is also well-known for her use of irony and sarcasm. Like
Estrich, she reserves some of her strongest irony and sarcasm for her
rebuttal of arguments she disagrees with, flouting yet another convention
of traditional legal writing. 136 The frequently repeated title phrase, Only
Words, is MacKinnon's ironic encapsulation of the propornography
logic. 137 MacKinnon also treats other feminist theories with sarcasm,
describing feminist equality theory as having a "paradigm trauma"
whenever women are relegated to a "second class" under a male
standard and "refuse to smile about it." 138 Critiquing the law created by
the equality and difference paradigms, MacKinnon notes:
The special benefits side of the difference approach has not compensated for the
differential of being second class.... We [women] ... get protected out of jobs
because of our fertility. The reason is that the job has health hazards, and
somebody who might be a real person some day and therefore could sue-that
is, a fetus-might be hurt if women, who apparently are not real persons and
therefore can't sue ... are given jobs that subject our bodies to possible harm.
Excluding women is always an option if equality feels in tension with the
pursuit itself. . . . Take combat Somehow it takes the glory out of the foxhole,
the buddiness out of the trenches, to imagine us out there. You get the feeling

136. Most advocacy texts caution legal writers against use of these devices when
responding to an opponent's argument, where it is both most tempting and, at least as
conventional wisdom has it, least effective. See, e.g., FAJANS & FALK, supra note 10, at
116 (noting that the "deceitful use oflanguage," such as sarcasm, mock humility, or fake
candor, is likely to damage the author); RAY & RAMSFIELD, supra note 10, at 268
(suggesting the avoidance of sarcasm in legal writing because it is inappropriate and too
easily taken literally); SCHUL1Z & SIRICO, supra note 10, at 313 (stating that "[s]arcasm
is always inappropriate" in legal writing); SHAPO ET AL., supra note 10, at 321
(indicating that "heavy irony [and] hyperbole ... are inappropriate in brief-writing").
137. MacKinnon further diverges from legal convention by placing the ironic
phrasing of the opposing side's argument in the prominent title position.
138. MACKINNON, Difference, supra note 48, at 36.
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they might rather end the draft, they might even rather not fight wars at all than
have to do it with us. 139

The irony and sarcasm in MacKinnon's and Estrich's writing are clear
examples of negation. The use of these negative devices certainly places
those parts of the texts outside the conventions of legal writing. The use
of the devices does create some distance between author and her
audience, evidenced by the sometimes inexcusably harsh responses to
Mac Kinnon' s and Estrich' s writing, especially from men. 140 Irony
combined with sarcasm sounds angry and condescending; use of these
tools can be alienating. Artfully used, however, as they are in both
pieces, irony and sarcasm can also be powerful and attention grabbing.
Moreover, as used by MacKinnon and Estrich, neither irony nor sarcasm
creates ambiguity; no intelligent reader is likely to think that MacKinnon
believes women are not "real persons" or that Estrich believes
acquaintance rape is not "real rape," so the conventional worry that irony
is risky because of possible misinterpretation seems misplaced.
It is hardly surprising that, as the language (antilanguage) of an
anticulture, feminist legal writing makes use of negation. Women's
existence under patriarchy is not only negative, but women's
experiences are often paradoxical: the world often looks upside-down to
us. Things that the dominant world views as "good" or "pleasurable"
may be "bad" and "painful" to us. 141 Thus, our writing will be
paradoxical, oxymoronic, ironic, and sometimes sarcastic; it will often
reclassify so-called fundamental truths about the world. It will often
sound negative. Despite legal convention, however, these characteristics
do not make this type of feminist legal writing poor writing; they make it
antiwriting, a writing of resistance. Why should these techniques have
no place in conventional legal advocacy?
C. Poetic Devices: Metaphor, Figures of Speech, and Rhythm

Figures of speech and other poetic rhetorical devices are also a part of
feminist legal antilanguage. Feminist legal antilanguage makes frequent
use of figures of speech involving repetition and syntactic inversion.
139. Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted).
140. See Estrich, supra note 131, at 1089 (noting that she has been harassed as a
result of her conscious and open discussion of her rape); Carlin Romano, Between the
Motion and the Act, 257 NATION 563, 563 (1993) (threatening to rape MacKinnon
because he is "uncertain whether she understands the difference between being raped and
being exposed to pornography"); Richard Grenier, The Real 'New McCarthyism, ' WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1994, available at 1994 WL 5503153 (comparing MacKinnon to Adolf
Hitler).
141. See West, Women's Bedonie Lives, supra note 48, at 149.
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Moreover, a substantial amount of the description and argumentation is
metaphorical. Part of this has to do with Halliday' s theory that
antilanguage, as derivative of the dominant language, makes use of
metaphor to translate the experiences of its speakers, for whose
experiences there is no direct language in the dominant tongue. This
certainly may be partially at the root of the degree of poetry, metaphor,
and simile in feminist legal writing. The prevalence of metaphor and
simile may also be rhetorical-an attempt to connect with the audience
and to liken women's experiences (with which the audience may not be
familiar) to something that the audience does understand. 142 The use of
poetic devices of repetition and inversion also gives the writing
rhetorical power by adding rhythm and emotion to the work. 143 It may
also be that the use of poetry, which has held a special place in the
· history of feminism, 144 is a political choice.
Despite their place in classical rhetoric, the extensive use of poetry
and complex metaphor and simile mark a text as legal antilanguage
because their use usually breaks the clarity and ease rules of persuasive
legal writing. Poetic devices can often make the writing inaccessible to
the reader who is busy or unwilling to work to understand. The poetic
quality of feminist legal writing also relinquishes interpretive control to
the reader. Poetry creates a gap between words and interpretation that
challenges the reader, who frequently must read sentences several times
and think to decipher the layers of meaning. 145 Metaphors and similes
can have the same effect if their references are obscure, or their
analogies not obvious. Syntactic inversion often makes for complex,

142. See Singer, supra note 8, at 2455-56 (arguing that analogy, not straight
narrative, is what speaks to people who otherwise have no shared experience). Metaphor
and simile can be seen as poetic forms of analogizing or comparing.
143. Rhetorical schemes of repetition are deliberate methods used to establish a
"marked rhythm" in the work, both for emphasis and for a "strong emotional effect."
CORBETT& CONNORS, supra note 24, at 391. The schemes of repetition are rare in prose
writing, in part, because they are thought to "spring[] spontaneously from intense
emotion." Id. at 392.
144. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229, 334 n.614
(1994) (noting the centrality of poetry to feminism and the dedication of many women's
law journals to feminist poetry); see generally THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:
WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 2d
ed. 1983).
145. Consider the examples from MacKinnon infra notes 156-64 and
accompanying text.
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difficult-to-read sentences. 146 Feminist legal writing employing poetic
devices creates the impression that the writer has deliberately chosen to
challenge the reader to struggle to understand. The message seems to be
that the dedicated reader who rises to the challenge will be rewarded
with a greater sense of meaning and knowledge than he may have
obtained through more straightforward legal prose. As anyone who has
taught law school knows, knowledge and understanding worked for and
self-won are both long-lasting and more meaningful to the student. 147
For sheer proliferation of poetic devices, no feminist legal work equals
MacKinnon's Only Words. 148 Only Words makes such extensive use of
poetic devices that it is impossible to catalogue them all. The artful use
of poetry and classical rhetoric in Only Words gives the piece a power,
beauty, and rhythm unusual in legal writing. For example, there are no
fewer than ten examples of classical rhetorical schemes of repetition in
the first fifteen pages of Only Words, most frequently when MacKinnon
is describing women's experiences in pomography. 149 Describing how
pornography makes the abuse of women continuous and permanent,
MacKinnon uses both "anaphora" 150 and "epistrophe," 151 as well as
another scheme of repetition called "polysyndeton," which is the
deliberate, successive use of several conjunctions. 152 She writes: "You
always know that the pictures are out there somewhere, sold or traded or
shown around or just kept in a drawer. . . . What he felt as he watched
you as he used you is always being done again and lived again and felt
again through the pictures ...." 153

146. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 24, at 391-92 (noting that schemes of
repetition are common in poetry because poetry is a form of language focused on
expression that is marked by a significant gap between writer intent and reader
comprehension).
147. This is the theory behind one of the most common forms of law school
teaching, the Socratic method. Mary Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching
Students How to "Think Like Lawyers": Integrating the Socratic Method with the
Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 885, 887 (1991).
148. This is perhaps less than surprising, given that Only Words began (ironically)
as a series of speeches. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at v. The work begs to be read
aloud.
149. Id. at 3-18.
150. Anaphora is the "repetition of the same word or group of words at the
beginnings of successive clauses." CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 24, at 390.
151. Epistrophe is the "repetition of the same word or group of words at the ends of
successive clauses." Id. at 391.
152. Id. at 388.
153. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 4 (emphasis added). The repetition of"he" is
anaphora. The repetition of "or" and "and" is polysyndeton. The repetition of "again" is
epistrophe. Throughout this section of the Article, italics appear in the quotations to help
the reader see the repetition and the inversion; often the italics parallel the quoted
source's original italicized emphases.
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Just a few pages later, in describing the history of how the pornography
debate was framed in law, MacKinnon again uses a long series of
anaphora:
A long time before the women's movement made this information available, in
the absence of the words of sexually abused women, in the vacuum of this
knowledge, in the silence of this speech, the question of pornography was
framed and debated-its trenches dug, its moves choreographed, its voices
rehearsed. Before the invention of the camera ... before the rise of a mammoth
profitmaking industry of pictures and words acting as pimp; before women
spoke out about sexual abuse . . . the question of the legal regulation of
pornography was framed as a question of the freedom of expression of the
pornographers and their consumers. 154

And again, on the next page:
Before, each woman who said she was abused looked incredible or exceptional;
now, the abuse appears deadeningly commonplace. Before, what was done to
her was sex; now it is sexual abuse. Before, she was sex; now, she is a human
being gendered female-if anyone can figure out what that is.155

As MacKinnon's argument evolves, her prose becomes even more
poetic and complex. When she explains the convoluted and insidious
relationship of pornography and speech and sexual abuse, she uses both
schemes of repetition and grammatical inversion:
Protecting pornography means protecting sexual abuse as speech, at the same
time that both pornography and its protection have deprived women of speech,
especially speech against sexual abuse. . . . The operative definition of
censorship accordingly shifts from government silencing what powerless people
say, to powerful people violating powerless people into silence and hiding
behind state power to do it 156

Similarly, the First Amendment and pornography's valuation of the
consumer's sexual gratification over the need to stop the abuse of
women is accomplished through an extended, complex series of
repetitive schemes:
Because the purveyor is protected in sending, and the consumer in receiving, the
thought or feeling, the fact that an unintended bystander might have offended
154. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Note that in addition to anaphora, there are several
oxymorons here ("vacuum of this knowledge," "silence of this speech"), as well as some
personification ("pictures and words acting as pimp"). See supra notes 61-76 and
accompanying text (discussing negation and reclassification).
155. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 9 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added and in original). Within this paragraph, anaphora
and epistrophe are combined with a scheme of inversion, chiasmus. CORBETT &
CONNORS, supra note 24, at 394-95.
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thoughts or unpleasant feelings is a mere extemality . . . . That the First
Amendment protects this process of interchange-thought to thought, feeling to
feeling-there is no doubt.
... Whatever damage is done through such words is done not only through
their context but through their content, in the sense that if they did not contain
what they contain, and convey the meanings and feelings and thoughts they
convey, they would not evidence or actualize the discrimination that they do.151

Note in these excerpts how the poetry gives the sentences great
rhetorical power, but also makes them complex and challenging to read.
Only Words is not an easy read on any level, but the many levels of
complexity in MacKinnon's sentences compel the reader to look closely.
Another common classical scheme used throughout Only Words is
"antimetabole," which involves repetition and grammatical inversion,
and the related scheme of "chiasmus," which involves only grammatical
inversion. 158 Antimetabole and chiasmus add not only rhythm but a
certain "magic" to writing-one that makes the writing memorable and
gives it impact. 159 Both of these schemes "have the air of the 'neatly
turned phrase' ... that figures in most memorable aphorisms." 160 They
are also, interestingly, often used to reinforce "antithesis," which is a
classical rhetorical scheme of construction in which contrasting ideas are
juxtaposed for effect. 161 Antithesis can also be categorized as a type of
negation in that it compares things that are not like one another.
MacKinnon frequently uses antimetabole and chiasmus in her logical
reasoning: "In pornography, pictures and words are sex. At the same
time, in the world pornography creates, sex is pictures and words. As
sex becomes speech, speech becomes sex." 162 MacKinnon offers another
extraordinarily intricate and extended series of repetitions and
inversions:
[T]he First Amendment has grown as if a commitment to speech were no part of
a commitment to equality and as if a commitment to equality had no implications
for the law of speech . . . . Fourteenth Amendment equality ... has grown as if
equality could be achieved while the First Amendment protected the speech of
inequality, meaning whenever inequality talces an expressive form, and without
considering equal access to speech as central to any equality agenda. 163

157. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 11-14 (emphasis added).
158. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 24, at 394-95.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 394.
161. Id. at 382-83, 395. Antithesis is related to the classical topics of dissimilarity
and contraries. Id. at 96-97 (discussing topic of difference), 105-06 (discussing topic of
contraries). The topics are "general heads or categories" that suggest "general strategies
of development" of arguments. Id. at 86. They are basically a list of ways to argue or
develop ideas, such as similarity, difference, degree, or cause and effect. Id. at 84-87.
162. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 26 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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She also uses the two schemes so that what the reader may perceive (or
wants to perceive) as the line between sex and sexual abuse is confused
and blurred: ''I am not ultimately sure why this is the case, but it has
something to do with the positioning of sex words in sexual abuse, in
abuse as sex, in sex as abuse, in sex." 164
Schemes of repetition and inversion also appear in the feminist
writings of Robin West and Patricia Williams. In Women's Bedonie
Lives, for example, Robin West uses an extended and elaborate
combination of the classical rhetorical devices of anaphora, epistrophe,
and polysyndeton to describe women's knowledge of and experience of
male violence:
I hear about the date rapes of students ... my male colleagues do not. The
story is always prefaced by, "Don't tell anyone." I hear (men don't) about
marital violence. It is always prefaced by: "Don't tell anyone; he'd kill me"
(which might be true) or "don't tell anyone, he'd lose his job" (which is hardly
ever true) or "don't tell anyone, I'd be ashamed" (which is always true). I hear
women's memories of early sexual abuse. "Don't tell anyone." I draw this
simple inference: Women and men have wildly different "ignorant" intuitions
about the amount of danger, violence and fear in women's lives because women
live it and men don't and women tell other women and not men. 165

West again uses schemes of repetition and inversion to describe her own
experience in a battering relationship:
Pleasures were for others. Sensuality was for others. "Personal welfare" was
for others. Subjectivity was for others. . . . I learned to view this as both
natural and as naturally inarticulable, meaning I learned not just to lie, but to
be a lie, to embody lying, to have no entitlement to either truth or language. I
learned to be for another's violence and to view it as my reason for being, and I
learned not to think about it much. 166

And again, in describing the result (or "lesson") of battering on the
victimized woman: "If you are going to be at all, you are going to be for
him. And you are going to be, so you are going to be for him." 161
Patricia Williams's use of repetition and inversion, like West's, gives
emotion and passion to her writing. In her discussion of the Tawana
Brawley case, she confronts the popular argument that no crime was
committed against Tawana, although Tawana was found catatonic,

164. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
165. West, Women's Bedonie Lives, supra note 48, at 164-65 (emphasis added and
in original).
166. Id. at 167 (emphasis added and in original).
167. Id. at 168 (emphasis added and in original).
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mutilated, and smeared with excrement:
This much is certainly worth the conviction that Tawana Brawley has been the
victim of some unspeakable crime. No matter how she got there. No matter
who did it to her-and even if she did it to herself. Her condition was clearly
the expression of some crime against her, some tremendous violence, some
great violation that challenges comprehension. 168

Williams uses similar rhetorical tools to point out the qualitative
difference in the stereotypes of white and black women. The following
series of sentences contain not only schemes of repetition, but also a
scheme of construction, antithesis, as well as extended simile and
metaphor:
White women are prostitutes; black women are whores. White women sell
themselves, in implied Dickensian fashion, because they are jaded and
desperate; black women whore as a way of being, as an innateness of sootiness
and contamination, as a sticky-sweet inherency of black womanhood
persistently imaged as overripe fruit-so they whore, according to this fantasyscript, as easily as they will cut your throat or slit open said deep sweet fruit,
spitting out afterwards a predictable stream of blood and seeds and casual
curses.[] Black women whore because it is sensual and lazy and vengeful. 169

The pastiche of rhetorical schemes in this passage give it not only
beauty, poetry, and rhythm, but a power and passion that it would not
have in more straightforward prose. The writing may not be as simple
and clear as convention would dictate, but it has a richness and vividness
not typical of legal writing.
In addition to grammatical schemes of construction, repetition, and
inversion, feminist legal antilanguage is rich with metaphor and
simile. 170 Often, the metaphors dominate the text, or their analogies are
obscure or unconventional, separating them from the use of these devices
in conventional legal writing. 171 Sometimes, the use of metaphor in feminist

168. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 169-70 (emphasis added). A similar, but even
lengthier, stream of repetition and parallelism appears on page 173 in Williams'
illustration of how Tawana Brawley' s story became drowned out by "all the thunder and
smoke of raucous male outcry, curdling warrior accusations, the flash of political swords
and shields." Id. at 173. In the extended sentence on page 173, the word "by" is used to
begin six successive clauses. Id.
169. Id. at 175 (emphasis added and in original).
170. This is consistent with Halliday's hypothesis that antilanguages will use
metaphor as the "norm" of expression. Halliday, supra note 5, at 579 ("[W]e should
expect metaphorical compounding, metatheses, rhyming alterations, and the like to be
among its regular patterns of realization.").
171. The use of metaphor in conventional legal writing is a well-occupied field.
See, e.g., HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (Robert K.
Burdette ed., 1992); Hibbitts, supra note 144, at 234-35 & n.33; Laura E. Little, Hiding
with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 75, 105-07 (1998) (analyzing use of metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy in
federal jurisdiction opinions).
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legal antilanguage is so extended as to be more like allegory or parable
than metaphor, or is made negative through the use of negative words or
analogies or through sarcasm or irony.
MacKinnon uses metaphor and simile in Only Words for a number of
rhetorical purposes: sometimes to emphasize the gender divide created
by patriarchy and solidified by pornography, sometimes to shock. Parts
of Only Words are explicitly gender segregated by MacKinnon's use of
synecdoche, a figure of speech in which a part is used to stand for the
whole. 172 This explicit gender segregation is what sets MacKinnon' s use
of synecdoche apart from conventional legal writing, which encourages
gender neutrality. MacKinnon uses the feminine pronouns singular (she,
her) or the second person singular (you, your) to refer to all women and
the masculine pronoun singular (he, him, his) to refer to all men:
He has them . . . . What he felt as he watched you as he used you is always
being done again and lived again and felt again through the pictures-your
violation his arousal, your torture his pleasure. Watching you was how he got
off doing it; with the pictures he can watch you and get off any time. 173

MacKinnon also uses simile and synecdoche to shake the reader loose
from his preconceptions. In describing how, during the Clarence Thomas
hearings, .Anita Hill's testimony made her (not him) look dirty,
MacKinnon uses both synecdoche and a startling and distasteful simile
that would be way out of bounds in conventional legal writing:
What happens when you put the real language of sexual abuse in a Senate
confirmation hearing? . . . It, and you, are treated as if you do not belong, as if
you pulled down your pants and defecated in public. You are lowered by
proving your injury. He is not. 174

MacKinnon also uses metaphor and simile to illustrate her theory of
dominance, which argues that patriarchy is purposefully constructed to
keep women oppressed. Thus, when she describes how the legal
arguments surrounding pornography have been framed, she notes: "A
long time before the women's movement made ... information [about
sexual a~use] available ... the question of pornography was framed and
debated-its trenches dug, its moves choreographed, its voices
172. CORBE1T, supra note 6, at 445.
173. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 4 (emphasis added). Note that there are other
schemes of repetition in this passage as well, including anaphora, epistrophe, and
polysyndeton.
174. Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added). Note here again the use of the second person
singular and the male singular pronoun.
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rehearsed." 175 In one sentence, MacK.innon depicts the pornography
debate as simultaneously a war (with trenches dug) and a preordained
(literally) song and dance (already choreographed and rehearsed). She
thus reveals the "debate" of pornography to be anything but the free and
open "marketplace" of ideas connoted by the word "debate." Rather,
MacKinnon conveys to the reader that the idea of a "pornography
debate" is an oxymoron because it is a debate whose result has already
been purposefully decided and orchestrated. The debate itself (like a
dance) is just "for show." Another vivid metaphor used by MacK.innon
to illustrate dominance is the image of men's feet on women's necks. 176
Far more vivid and troubling than a more conventional description of
oppression or sexism, this metaphor calls up the physicality of male
dominance over women (and how it is maintained by physical force). It
illustrates colorfully why women are silent (we have heavy feet on our
larynxes) and, often, scared.
Patricia Williams's use of metaphor is even more extensive and
challenging to the reader than MacK.innon's. Williams purposefully sets
out to challenge her readers by consciously refusing to follow the linear
structure of conventional legal writing. 177 Her writing extends the use of
metaphor in a way that frequently approaches allegory or parable. 178
Allegory, and especially parable, often leave the reader to interpret the
meaning or lesson conveyed, giving the reader an interpretive power
unheard of in conventional legal writing. 179
In chapter four of The Alchemy of Race and Rights, entitled
"Teleology on the Rocks," and subtitled "(or Spirit-Murdering the
Messenger)," Williams writes of racism and sexism in law school using
a variety of similes and an extended metaphor describing law school as
another planet:
My abiding recollection of being a student at Harvard Law School is the
sense of being invisible. I spent three years wandering in a murk of unreality. I
observed large, mostly male bodies assert themselves against one another like
football players caught in the gauzy mist of intellectual slow motion. I stood
my ground amid them, watching them deflect from me ... as if I were a pillar in
a crowded corridor. Law school was for me like being on another planet, full of
alienated creatures ....
Perhaps there were others who felt what I felt. Perhaps we were all aliens,
all silenced by the dense atmosphere ....

175. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
176. MACKINNON, Difference, supra note 48, at 45 ("Take your foot off our necks,
then we will hear in what tongue women speak.").
177. See WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 7-8.
178. See CORBETT, supra note 6, at 444-45. An allegory is "an extended or
continued metaphor." Id. at 444. Parable is "an anecdotal narrative designed to teach a
moral lesson" and is "[c]losely allied" with allegory. Id. at 445.
179. See id. at 445.
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When I became a law professor, I found myself on yet another planet: a
planet with a sun as strong as a spotlight and an atmosphere so thin that my
slightest murmur would travel for miles .... 180

In the next paragraph, Williams tells a story which seems to have little
connection to the previous paragraphs (which are all about her feelings
while in law school), except that the experience happened to a friend of
Williams' while both Williams and the friend were in law school. In the
story, Williams's friend, also a black woman, is terrorized at gunpoint by
a SWAT team in Florida because she refused to pay for a glass of sour
milk served to her in a restaurant outside Miami. 181 Williams's friend
was in Florida during Christmas break from Harvard Law School. 182
She had asked for another glass, but was ignored; when she refused to
pay, a patrolman who was in the restaurant ordered her to pay (and drew
his gun). 183 It was only after some give and take with the patrolman that
Williams' friend noticed that she was surrounded by a SWAT team, in
full gear and guns drawn. During all this, the milk stayed in the glass,
with "curdle hanging on the sides." 184
At superficial glance, it is not clear what this story is doing in a book
about law, in a chapter about law school, or in a chapter about
"teleology" that goes on to discuss, among other things, the Howard
Beach incident and Bernhard Goetz. 185 Moreover, Williams never tells
her reader outright why she is inserting the story or what the story
"means." 186 Such an overt surrender of control to the reader would be
most unusual in any kind of persuasive legal writing (as would the use of
parable generally). But it is worth asking whether convention's
banishing of extended metaphor and parable is closing off a potentially
persuasive tool. Williams's use of it works on the reader--even, or
especially, the lawyer reader-in a number of ways. First, the reader
cannot help but be shocked and outraged at the racism in the story.
Williams tells it artfully and it is an appalling story. We may know,
intellectually, that there is racism in our society, but this story shows us,
180. WlLLIAMS, supra note 91, at 55-56 (emphasis added). The italics highlight the
words of simile.
181. Id. at 56-57. This description does not do the story (or Williams' expression
of it) much justice, but it is a bit too long to reproduce in full here. It is worth reading in
the context of the whole chapter, if not the whole book.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Id. at56-57.
184. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at55-79.
186. This is typical of parable. See CORBETT, supra note 6, at 445.
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vividly and graphically, its depth, its tenacity, and its violence. 187
However, to label Williams' s use of parable as a method of playing to
emotion misses its simultaneous appeal to the reader's intellect and
logic. A natural reaction to this story is to wonder what the story is
doing in the book. Most lawyers are intellectually curious enough to
react to this story by thinking about what it means and why Williams
placed it where she did. It is a puzzle, an intellectual challenge; if we
lawyers do anything, we like to think we are good puzzle solvers and
that we can figure most things out. Thus, it is worth wondering whether
this device, which convention suggests demands too much from the
reader, might work on the legal audience more successfully than
conventional prose in some contexts. The lure of Williams's prose
should at least lead us to ask whether it is possible that legal convention
underestimates the willingness and astuteness of the legal audience.
Williams also uses the legal antilanguage tool of allegory to achieve a
conventional persuasive end: to make complex legal concepts clearer or
simpler. To demonstrate how "neutrality" and "original intent" are
problematic constitutional principles, Williams tells the reader a story
about the Rockettes. 188 The Rockettes, a female dance troupe noted for
its uniform high kicking, consisted, until 1987, of all white women. 189
The director of the Rockettes defended the "all-white line" by noting
that the hallmark of the troupe was uniform, mirror images and that
"[o]ne or two black girls" would destroy the image of "precision" and
would be "distract[ing]." 190 In this passage, Williams is explicit about
her purpose: she writes that when she read the director's statement she
"saw allegory-all of society pictured in that one statement." 191
Williams also is explicit in this chapter about the point of the
Rockettes story: to reveal the inherent bias in "neutral[ity]" and the
impossibility of applying a "colorblind" constitutional paradigm in the
context of a society with a long and deep history of racism. 192 Williams's
use of the Rockettes allegory, among other effects, demonstrates the
racism inherent in a colorblind standard to lawyers who could miss or
187. This is one way that Williams shows her readers that what she calls "spirit
murder" has a very real, violent quality to it. Much of the time, racism is deadly.
188. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 116-17. This is not the only example of
Williams' use of narrative to illuminate. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of
Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1001 (1991).
189. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 116.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 117. Williams states that the "example of the Rockettes is a lesson in
why the limitation of original intent as a standard of constitutional review is problematic,
particularly where the social text is an 'aesthetic of uniformity' -as it appears to be in a
formalized, strictly scrutinized but colorblind liberal society." Id.
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deny it by focusing on the complex, intellectualized legal stories in the
case law. Even for lawyers schooled in reading case law, it is easier to
see (literally and figuratively) racism in the maintenance of an all-white
Rockettes line than in a court decision disallowing minority set-asides in
government contracts. 193
Finally, Susan Estrich also uses extended metaphor and simile
throughout her article, Rape. Throughout Estrich's otherwise fairly
conventional piece of legal writing, 194 she continuously likens the law of
rape, especially its requirements of resistance and force, to '"boys' rules'
applied to a boys' fight." 195 This metaphor is unconventional in two
ways: first, its extensive use is unusual for legal writing; second, and
even more unconventional, is its disparaging, negative tone. The analogy
implies that rape law's view of force and resistance is silly, superficial,
simplistic, and crude. Estrich describes the use of force traditionally
enforced in rape cases as what "schoolboys do on the playground: Force
is when he hits me; resistance is when I hit back." 196 When a woman
says "no" and cries in response to rape, the law does not recognize this
as legal resistance because it "is the reaction of 'sissies' in playground
fights," and the law defines force "solely in schoolboy terms." 197
Through the metaphor, Estrich makes her point not only about the
gender unfairness created by the law (schoolboys versus sissies) but also
about the absurdity of the law. Although the tone of the metaphor and
the repetition of it bring parts of Rape closer to legal antilanguage and
away from convention, it also allows Estrich to do so much more
memorably and effectively than a direct statement.
The writing of the feminist legal scholars analyzed here is a kind of
law poetry. The poetry of the writing is both what marks it as an
antilanguage and what gives the writing much of its force. Although
193. See id. at 117-18. Williams compares her Rockettes story briefly to the
Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989), in
which the Supreme Court held that a plan requiring contractors awarded city contracts to
subcontract a certain amount of the contract to minority business enterprises was
unconstitutional discrimination based on race.
194. Conventional legal writing is conventional in writing and expression, but not
necessarily in substance. That is, Estrich's ideas about rape might be radical, but her
writing looks more like usual legal reasoning and writing than, for example, that of
MacKinnon or Williams.
195. Estrich, supra note 131, at 1091. Sometimes the comparison is done by simile,
sometimes by metaphor. Id. at 1095, 1105, 1111-12, 1155.
196. Id. at 1105.
197. Id. at 1111-12.
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convention does not usually characterize it as such, poetic devices can be
persuasive on a number of levels: they can make writing more emotive,
more memorable and, quite simply, more beautiful than conventional
legal advocacy. The use of poetic devices is also a way to make
impact-to insist, through repetition, to catch the reader's attention
(through repetition and grammatical inversion) and to make the reader
see and hear about experiences that are (probably) beyond the reader's
scope of experience. It appeals to the reader's intellect and emotion at
the same time to make the reader both feel and think about the author's
point. Finally, the aphoristic quality of the poetry is "catchy"-it can
serve to embed the thoughts and feelings into the reader's consciousness.
D. Narrative Standpoint and Emotion
Feminist legal antilanguage is both more personal and, similarly, more
unabashedly emotional than conventional legal writing. Perhaps this is a
conscious reflection of that old feminist axiom, "the personal is
political." It also might be a natural byproduct of the use of
consciousness raising as a feminist legal method. 198 Whatever the cause,
feminist legal writing pushes legal advocacy beyond conventional
persuasion's uneasy relationship with subjectivity and emotion. The
primary rhetorical vehicles for this are feminist legal writing's use of
first-person narrative, firmly disallowed in conventional legal writing,
and feminist legal writing's explicit appeals to emotion through use of
the second person, in violation of legal convention's "Golden Rule."
Feminist legal writing uses first-person narrative for many different
reasons. 199 This Article, however, is concerned primarily with the use of
first-person narrative as a tool of rhetoric-as a way to persuade the
reader. As a rhetorical tool, first-person narrative is often seen as an
appeal to emotion more than an apgeal to reason, though there are
elements of reason embedded as well. 00 Sometimes, however, feminist
198. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
863-67 (1990).
199. For excellent analyses of the storytelling movement in feminist and other legal
writing, see generally Abrams, supra note 188; Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
200. In fact, one of the subtexts of feminist writing (and this Article) is that the
law's stark separation between emotion and reason is mistaken; in fact, human emotion
and reason are intertwined and entangled in a way that makes them impossible to
separate, especially as bases for decision making. Because they are so intertwined, it
makes little sense to try to separate, categorize, and value rhetorical writing tools based
on whether they appeal to reason or emotion. See Baron, supra note 199, at 277-80; see
generally Martha Minow, Feminist Reasoning: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL
Eouc. 47 (1988); Martha L. Minow & Elisabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, IO
CARDOZOL. REv. 37 (1988).
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legal writers use the first person to do something qualitatively different
from, for example, a highly sympathetic or emotional third-person
account (which is not rare in legal writing). For example, some feminist
legal writers use the first person to establish their character or
competence to speak on a legal subject-a classic "ethical appeal" or
ethos, which is one of the three Aristotelian modes of persuasion.201
Similarly, because the authors of feminist legal scholarship are mostly
women who have succeeded in the profession of the law, they write
from a position of established credibility. Thus, the first-person
standpoint can serve to neutralize the skepticism that the legal audience
may harbor toward feminist arguments or women's accounts of sexism
or misogyny. Other times, however, first-person narratives accomplish a
purpose similar to the advocate' s purpose in writing a persuasive
statement of facts. Instead of trying to persuade a court to adopt the
client's view of the facts, first-person narrative compels the audience to
see circumstances or rules from the author's perspective, through the
author's lens of experience.202
The rhetorical value of first-person narrative as an ethical appeal
is evident in the feminist writing of both Susan Estrich and Martha
Mahoney. Estrich begins her ground-breaking article, Rape, by describing
the facts of her own rape.203 Apart from the first-person standpoint, this
is a fairly common persuasive legal device: start with strong facts that
will bring the reader to your side. But the first-person standpoint adds to
Estrich' s credibility as a person qualified to critique rape law; she knows
the law's deficiencies because she has experienced them. 204 Estrich
explicitly cites this as a reason for her first-person account.205 However,
in addition to establishing her competence to critique the way the law

201. CORBETT, supra note 6, at 37. The other two are appeal to reason (logos) and
appeal to emotion (pathos). Id. Quintilian thought the ethical appeal to be the most
effective and necessary kind of persuasive device. Id. at 80.
202. The object of this is to try to get the audience to "see the world from the
standpoint of the oppressed" as urged by Professor Mari Matsuda. Matsuda, supra note
82, at 299.
203. Estrich, supra note 131, at 1087-88.
204. See Abrams, supra note 188, at 983-84. First-hand knowledge makes a
witness in law quintessentially competent to testify on a subject. It is the preferred
source of knowledge. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 657(a) (1979); 1
KENNETII s. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 10, 69 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992).
205. Estrich, supra note 131, at 1089 ("I cannot imagine myself writing on rape
without disclosing how I learned my first lessons or why I care so much.").
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handles rape victims, Estrich uses her own experience to lend credibility
to the accounts of other rape victims. For example, she tells her
audience about her reaction to her own rape to counter those in the legal
audience who might view rape victims as weak, stupid, or unreasonable
for failing to fight back:
For myself, it is not at all difficult to understand that a woman who had been
repeatedly beaten, who had been a passive victim of both violence and sex
during the "consensual" relationship, who had sought to escape from the man,
who is confronted and threatened by him, who summons the courage to tell him
their relationship is over only to be answered by his assertion of a "right" to
sex-a woman in such a position would not fight. She wouldn't fight; she
might cry.... Hers is, from my reading, the most common reaction of women
to rape. It certainly was mine.206

Martha Mahoney uses a similar device to challenge her audience's
stereotypes of battered women. At the beginning of her article on the
legal images of battered women, Mahoney tells her reader that she
herself is a "battered woman":
One of these stories [of domestic violence] is my own. I do not feel like a
"battered woman." Really, I want to say that I am not, since the phrase conjures
up an image that fails to describe either my marriage or my sense of myself. It
is a difficult claim to make for several reasons: the gap between my selfperceived competence and strength and my own image of battered women, the
inevitable attendant loss of my own denial of painful experience, and the
certainty that the listener cannot hear such a claim without filtering it through a
variety of derogatory stereotypes. However, the definitions of battered women
have broad contours, at least some of which encompass my experience ....207

Like Estrich does with rape victims, Mahoney injects her personal
experience into her legal analysis to attack the predominant image of
what a battered woman is (that is, not including a law professor) and to
undermine the stereotype of the battered woman as "different,
exceptional, 'other. "'208
Another rhetorical goal of feminist personal storytelling is to try to
force the reader to see circumstances or law from the author's
perspective. In this way, first-person narrative in feminist legal
scholarship functions in much the same way as statements of facts in
persuasive writing or in compelling first-person testimony. The goal of
converting the reader's perspective is a well-settled, uncontroversial goal
of legal advocacy; first-person narrative simply changes the source of
the information. That is what makes it both controversial and
compelling. 209
206.
207.
208.
209.
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Id. at 1111 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Mahoney, supra note 87, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 14-15.
Self-reference is viewed as inappropriate in law practice and persuasive legal
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As any lawyer knows, good storytelling is a powerful rhetorical tool.
It can make the reader think about things differently and can force the
reader to acknowledge another perspective. Like all compelling fact
narratives, personal stories appeal to readers emotionally, and that
works. Whatever else critics say about personal narrative, one of the
primary critiques seems to be that it is too difficult to argue against, in
part, critics argt!e, because its personal emotional pull insulates it from
effective attack. 210
Patricia Williams explicitly declares her purpose of altering the
reader's perspective in the beginning of The Alchemy of Race and
Rights:
I am interested in the way in which legal language flattens and confines in
absolutes the complexity of meaning inherent in any given problem ....
. . . Legal writing presumes a methodology that is highly stylized,
precedential, and based on deductive reasoning. . . . I am trying to create a
genre of legal writing to fill the gaps of traditional legal scholarship. I would
like to write in a way that reveals the intersubjectivity of legal constructions,
that forces the reader both to participate in the construction of meaning and to
be conscious of that process.211

To this end, Williams tells the reader stories of her life. She tells the
reader what it is like to be a black, female, commercial law professor,
how her students react to her, how the law school administration
responds to student complaints about her, how a white teenager
condescendingly refuses her entrance to a posh store in New York City
(and her efforts to publish the story in a law journal), and her family
history. 212 It is almost impossible to read Williams's work and not see
her perspective-her writing forces you to see and experience it.
Whether the reader feels a sense of familiarity with the story ("that
writing, and it is quite controversial within legal scholarship as well. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,
45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 835-36 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional
Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 251-52 (1992). Upon close inspection, it is difficult to see
the material difference between a first-person account and a lawyer's recitation of what
is usually the client's first-person account (with all the inherent bias and memoryfaultiness of any first-person account). See Abrams, supra note 188, at 1002; Baron,
supra note 199, at 280--85 (analyzing problems of "truth" in legal storytelling).
210. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 209, at 836. Of course, lawyers attack the
narratives of other lawyers' clients all the time, and this is considered part of the debate
of litigation.
211. WILLIAMS, supra note 91, at 6-8.
212. Id. at 17-19, 21-48, 216-36.

431

happened to me, too!") or a sense of surprise ("do things like this really
happen?"), Williams's work requires the reader to consider her perspective,
even if that perspective is ultimately rejected.
Feminist legal antilanguage is also marked by use of the secondperson narrative standpoint to persuade the audience, in open defiance of
legal advocacy's Golden Rule. Like feminist writing in the first person,
feminist writing in the second person has a number of purposes (and
effects): to shock or jar the reader, to force the reader to engage another
viewpoint, and to force the reader to think and reflect. For example, in
Only Words, MacKinnon frequently directly addresses the reader by
using the second person ("you" or "your"), including in the opening
paragraph:
Imagine that for hundreds of years your most formative traumas, your daily
suffering and pain, the abuse you live through, the terror you live with, are
unspeakable-not the basis of literature. You grow up with your father holding
you down and covering your mouth so another man can make a horrible searing
pain between your legs. When you are older, your husband ties you to the bed
and drips hot wax on your nipples and brings in other men to watch and makes
you smile through it. Your doctor will not give you drugs he has addicted you
to unless you suck his penis. 213

By compelling the reader to put herself in these awful scenarios,
MacKinnon ensures that the reader will respond emotionally to her
work; whatever else it is, it is jarring, disturbing, and memorable. The
standpoint also forces the reader to live the hurt and misogyny of
pornography. MacKinnon does not allow her readers to abstract themselves
from the abuse and indulge in the denial that such experiences are not
relevant because they happen to "others."214 The standpoint is a way to
force the reader to experience the situation of the "other."
In addition to the narrative standpoint, this paragraph (like much of
MacKinnon' s writing) is visceral and relentlessly graphic. Both the
narrative standpoint and the vivid description of disgusting acts of abuse
make clear that MacKinnon wants to make her audience uncornfortable.215
213. MACKINNON, supra note 108, at 3.
214. See Mahoney, supra note 87, at 8.
215. The narrative standpoint, however, seems deliberately constructed to make
men uncomfortable. (My research assistant, Peter J. Isajiw, who is male, pointed this out
to me.) The "you" MacKinnon addresses anticipates a female audience, not only
because the "you" MacKinnon is speaking to experiences things that are characteristic of
women's, not men's, lives, but also because Only Words is otherwise an explicitly
gender-marked text. This is not an easy thing to do in English, so it is safe to assume
MacKinnon did it on purpose. See DWIGHT BOLINGER, LANGUAGE-THE LOADED
WEAPON 87-88, 93 (1980) (noting that gender-marking is harder to do in English than in
some languages which require all nouns to be gender marked).
MacKinnon
accomplishes this by using words such as "husband" and the pronouns "he," "him," and
"his" whenever she is referring to men. "You" and "your" refers to women. See supra
notes I I 8- I 9 and accompanying text.
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Legal convention would characterize this prose as inflammatory; others
might say it is almost violent. But it is hard to imagine what audience
could read this paragraph and think that the described acts are acceptable
male entertainment. It is no mistake that MacKinnon opens her book
with this "theory of the case." It gets the audience to pay attention to her
immediately and creates an enormous emotional incentive to agree with
her arguments.
Patricia Cain also directly addresses the reader in her feminist writing,
although she uses the second person in a different way than MacKinnon.
Cain addresses the reader to try to get the reader to think and reflect on
Cain's thesis. In the middle of Grounding the Theories, which is
otherwise written in a fairly straightforward way, Cain redirects Marilyn
Frye's challenge to heterosexual women to the legal audience:
Why don't women turn you on? Why aren't you attracted to women? . . . I
want heterosexual women to do intense and serious consciousness-raising and
exploration of their own personal histories and to find out how and when in
their own development the separation of women from the erotic came about for
them. I would like heterosexual women to be as actively curious about how and
why and when they became heterosexual as I have been about how and why and
when I became lesbian. 21 6

Cain then has an entire section of the article devoted to "silence," in
which she directs the reader to "[e]ngage in self-reflection."217 As a way
of guiding the reader, Cain anticipates the reader's response in brackets
and asks, among other things: "Did she really mean that? Am I
supposed to sit here and consider lesbianism as a possibility? . . . Why
not? ... And if I do consider it, but choose men anyway, is my choice
more authentic? What about tomorrow? Do I choose again?"218 Cain
breaks the Golden Rule by explicitly instructing the reader to ask herself
"why am I not a lesbian?" The violation of the Golden Rule is necessary
to Cain's thesis because society's presumption of heterosexuality makes
women's heterosexuality a "nonchoice" that is "natural" and needs no
exploration or explanation. Cain's work seeks to undermine or at least
question the heterosexual presumption and to make heterosexual women
question it. Cain's direct invitation to the reader creates a potential for
216.

Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4

BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 209-10 (1990) (quoting Marilyn Frye, A Lesbian
Perspective on Women's Studies, in LESBIAN STUDIES 194, 196 (M. Cruikshank ed.

1982)) (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 210.
218. Id.
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self-discovery that makes possible a serious change in the reader's view
of both law and culture. The personal and emotional impact on the
reader makes Cain's writing much more powerful and memorable than a
direct statement that "heterosexuality is considered normal and not the
product of choice."
As a rhetorical strategy, shifting narrative standpoint is indicative of
feminist legal antilanguage. None of the narrative shifts described would be
acceptable in conventional legal writing.
However, first-person
narrative can be a valuable persuasive tool for establishing the writer's
ethos. Much like establishing the first-hand knowledge of a witness,
first-person narrative can establish the competence of the writer to speak
on the subject. The use of the second-person standpoint-the Golden
Rule standpoint-is unquestionably effective; its rhetorical power is, in
fact, the source of its banishment from legal discourse. However, its
effective use in feminist antilanguage should lead us to ask, why?
V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article is not simply to show the radical beauty of
feminist legal writing, although I hope it does. Feminist legal (anti)writing is
beautiful: it is vivid, it is poetic, it is descriptive and metaphorical, and it
has a depth that one rarely sees in conventional legal writing. It is also
radical, negative, angry, and emotional. The scholarship analyzed here
breaks away from legal convention not only substantively and
methodologically, but linguistically-it is in some ways a different kind
of legal writing. But, like all antilanguages, feminist antilanguage
breaks the rules within the context of the dominant legal language and
culture. It is, in many ways, derivative or reactive. Relexicalization,
negation, poetry, and shifting standpoint are noteworthy in feminist legal
writing because they are not acceptable in conventional legal writing.
As rhetorical devices, they might have intrinsic power on their own, but
they derive significant force from their status as antilanguage devices.
Whatever the source of the power, feminist antilanguage, without
doubt, has power. It is not just beautiful, but functional. Thus, in part,
feminist legal antilanguage may challenge legal writing· s construction of
persuasive writing as almost entirely function without beauty-a
convention that is a marked change from classical notions of persuasion
and rhetorical excellence. Feminist legal antilanguage also challenges
the academy's insistence on the divide between legal writing and legal
doctrine or substance: feminist legal writing shows us the force of
radical writing to illustrate radical substance. Form does not merely
follow substance; it is substance. Negation is a rhetorical tool; it is also
useful to describe a predominantly negative experience. Paradox and
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irony are tools that express paradoxical and ironic experiences.
Feminist legal antilanguage also challenges legal readers and writers
to ask whether the culture of legal writing has been too narrowly
constructed. The radical rhetorical tools of feminist legal writing should
make us wonder whether we have underestimated the legal audience's
ability and willingness to read and be persuaded by certain tools. Why is
negation considered not persuasive? Why are irony and relexicalization
frowned upon? Why is it acceptable to use certain "emotional" techniques
and not others? Certainly, the constraints and rules of legal writing are
reifying: as students, we learn to write to an audience with certain
characteristics; as lawyers and judges, we become that audience, and
then we teach others (law students and lawyers) to cater to that audience;
and then those we teach become that audience, and on and on in an
endless loop.
The constraints of legal writing, and the persuasive value of rhetorical
tools, are not necessarily elemental or natural. They are created and
validated by legal culture. That means that they are not permanentthey can be challenged and questioned. Feminist legal antilanguage
ought to force us to ask why certain things are accepted in advocacy but
others not and whether these rules of writing are biased. Ultimately, we
need to ask what (or who) is the source of these persuasive writing rules.
It only begs the question to note that some things are persuasive and
other things are not; that is just the way it is. Why are some tools not
persuasive, why do they not reach the audience, not persuasive to whom?
Some have argued that it is erroneous to insist that "what works
[is] ... what ought to work" in persuasion.219 But why should we not
ask why "what ought to work" does not "work"? If Stanley Fish's
theories tell us anything, it is that language is the product of the culture,
that if the community of culture believes something to be persuasive, it
is persuasive; if the community believes something to be grammatical, it
is grammatical.220 So, saying that we should not confuse "what works"
with what "ought to work" denies our role as lawyers, judges, and law
professors in defining what works. We should not stop asking.
And, perhaps, we ought not stop trying. Perhaps it is too risky to use
even a little feminist legal antilanguage in conventional legal writing.
Perhaps use of feminist legal antilanguage in conventional legal writing

219.
220.

Singer, supra note 8, at 2444.
See FISH, supra note 13, at 194-95.
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is dangerous because it allows the appropriation of feminist language by
the dominant culture. However, if lawyers' and judges' notions of what
is persuasive can change, then advocates can (and should) broaden their
array of tools, especially when they are trying to explain the dilemmas,
poetry, and paradoxes in women's experiences. Judges are busy, but
most of them are also very smart and dedicated. If they dedicate
themselves to reading and understanding legal antilanguage (and I argue
that they should-it is their duty to listen and understand, even if it takes
a bit of work), then maybe change in law is possible, even through the
use of the "master's tool" of advocacy writing.
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